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Local governance and the municipality have a long history and tradition in Latin 
America going back to colonial times.1 It 
was only after the 1980s, and for many 
countries only in the last decade, that 
genuine decentralization reform efforts 
have come to invigorate and enhance the 
role of local governments. However, 
despite some significant progress to date, 
many challenges still remain for munici­
palities to play a vibrant and meaningful 
role in the delivery of public services and 
to contribute to improve the daily lives of 
Latin American citizens.2 
In the last two decades the Latin American 
region has seen a general trend toward an 
increased level of fiscal decentralization. 
Using the measure of sub-national 
expenditures as percent of national ex­
penditures, fiscal decentralization increa­
sed from an average of 13 percent in 1985 
to 19 percent in 2005; using the measure 
of sub-national expenditures as percent of 
GDP decentralization increased from 5.5 
percent in 2000 to 6.6 percent in 2007. 
However, there are significant variations in 
these trends across countries in the 
region.3 Overall, increased decentrali­
zation can be detected in the devolution of 
new responsibilities which includes the 
environment, the fight against poverty, 
and an increase in decentralized ex­
penditures for education, health, etc. Less 
progress can be detected in the devolution 
of autonomous revenue sources. 
Recent times have seen a variety of 
innovations in the region that have 
attracted interest from all corners of the 
world, such as ranking systems' local 
performance in Brazil and Colombia, per 
client based transfers for health and 
education in Chile, or fighting poverty with 
direct transfers to families administered 
by municipalities in Brazil. A good number 
of countries have embarked or are consi­
dering significant reforms that that will 
further strengthen municipal autonomy. 
For instance, Bolivia has recently approved 
a new Constitution to allow for better 
representation of different ethnic groups 
at the sub-national level; Uruguay lately 
introduced a third tier of government 
made up of 89 new municipalities; and 
Costa Rica only just approved the "Ley 
General de Transferencia de Competencias 
y Recursos a los Municipios" which 
provides the ability to transfer 10 percent 
of the national budget resources to the 
municipalities, clearing the way for 
local governments to assume new 
competencies and improve the quality of 
services and infrastructure. In El Salvador 
the association of municipalities (COMURES) 
is maintaining an active dialog with central 
authorities to increase the funding and 
general stability of the general transfer 
system (FODES) which represents between 
70-80 percent of local budgets, and was 
expected to reach 9 percent of the national 
budget in 2009 but because of the crisis it 
attained only 7.5 percent of the national 
budget. 
On the other hand, there are countries 
in the region where some trends have moved 
toward some forms of recentralization. 
For example, in Argentina the Law of 
Economic Emergency of 2002 and the 
Budget Law of 2006 have given central 
authorities increased discretion to assign 
federal funds or unilaterally interrupt their 
disbursement. In the Dominican Republic 
there have been elements of recen­
tralization with the Municipal Law of 
2007 establishing fixed budget shares 
for different types of expenditures on 
personnel, services, public infrastructure, 
and so on; it is also feared that the new 
constitution will lead to the general 
transfer fund of 10 percent of the state 
budget established in 2003 (but never 
implemented). Similarly, in Peru recent 
1. See United Cities and 
Local Governments 
2008 GOLD I report. 
2. The effectiveness of 
decentralization efforts 
has varied 
considerably across 
countries of the Latin 
America region. In the 
last decade, 
decentralization has 
moved at a fast pace 
in countries such as 
Colombia and Peru but 
it continues to be 
stagnant after several 
decades of planning 
and legal measures in 
countries such as the 
Dominican Republic 
and Haiti. Besides 
Brazil and all the 
Spanish-speaking 
countries of Latin 
America, this paper 
covers also Haiti, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. As 
shorthand, all the 
countnes will be 
addressed in this 
paper as Latin 
Amenca. 
3. See, for example, 
Daughters and Harper 
(2007). 
United Cities and Local Governments 
4. The focus of this report 
is on fiscal 
decentralization. 
Issues of political and 
administrative 
decentralization for the 
most part are not 
covered. 
5. Naturally, these 
countries are not 
usually classified as 
"Latin" America. 
6. In the technical 
parlance the vertical 
relationships between 
different levels of 
government are 
bifurcated (central to 
local and central to 
regional, separately) 
as opposed to 
hierarchical (central to 
regional to local, all 
linked). 
7. In contrast, for 
example, the Brazilian 
Constitution defines its 
political system as the 
union of the central 
government, the 
states, and the 
municipalities, thus 
giving local 
governments an 
autonomous standing 
vis-a-vis the 
intermediate level 
governments. 
8. Brazilian states also 
have some limited role 
in managing the 
municipalities. 
legislation has revoked the municipalities' 
prerogative to issue building licenses and 
rezoning of land use. The regular transfer 
funds allocated to municipalities have 
been significantly reduced from 2009 to 
2011 (a decline of 22 percent in the last 
five years). In Colombia, the central 
government has recently decided to 
directly allocate resources for water and 
sanitation that until then had been 
assigned to municipal governments 
(through a fiduciary fund administrated by 
Central Government). Finally, in Venezuela 
the municipal authorities have been 
denouncing the continuous curtailment of 
competencies and resources and the 
increasing encroachment of the central 
authorities in local matters. 
This report takes an in-depth look at the 
current state of the local public finances in 
the Latin America region, identifies and 
analyzes some of the main challenges for 
improving efficiency, equity and effecti­
veness in the delivery of public services 
and for promoting development and it 
closes by offering a set of observations 
concerning policy reform.4 
Structure and Performance 
of Local Government Finances 
in the Region 
Countries in the region are highly diverse 
along a number of dimensions: federal 
versus unitary, size, colonial tradition, etc. 
This diversity is found first among the four 
federal countries in the region: Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Among the 
countries with a unitary system we can 
identify clusters of countries with more 
similar institutions and current challenges, 
including the Andean countries (Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), the generally 
smaller countries of Central America, the 
Island States with non-Iberian traditions,5 
and what we could call the southern cone 
exceptions (Paraguay, Uruguay and espe­
cially Chile) because of their approach to 
fiscal decentralization. The diversity is also 
found in population size (from the 196 
million of Brazil to the one million of 
Trinidad and Tobago), in real GDP per 
capita (from $9,357 in Argentina in 2007 
in constant 2000 US dollars to $884 in 
Nicaragua and only $411 in Haiti), and in 
other dimensions. 
However, there are also many common 
features in the way municipalities are 
structured, which enables us to observe all 
municipal governments in the region from 
a common perspective. An important 
feature is that for those countries with 
more than one tier of sub-national 
government, the relationship between the 
central government and the municipalities 
is for the most part directly between these 
two levels as opposed to the central 
government dealing exclusively with the 
regional and local governments and then 
the latter dealing exclusively with the 
municipalities.6 In most cases, the legal 
status of the municipalities is clearly 
stated in the constitution or specialized 
laws, such as municipal codes. The most 
important exception to this rule is 
Argentina where the constitution gives the 
intermediate level government, the 
provinces, discretion to structure the fiscal 
arrangements with the municipalities.7 To 
a lesser extent the same story is repeated 
in Mexico.8 Thus, the key difference in 
explaining the different approaches to 
central-local relations is between "federal" 
and "unitary" nations. But even in the 
federal cases, the issues currently facing 
municipal governments are not essentially 
different from those being faced by the 
rest of the municipalities in the region. For 
this reason, the report will not make a 
point of identifying the different groups of 
country experiences but instead we will 
use a common framework for all countries, 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy 
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Decentralization in Latin America: Political and Territorial Organization (2007) I 
Country Levels Govt, level names 
of gov. 
I#) 
Intermediate Local 
Level Level 
(level 2) (level 3) 
Average Average 
Population Population 
Level2 Level 3 
Population in Population 
the largest in urban capita 
dty agglomerations (current USS) 
(% of urban >1 million 
population) (Xoftotal 
population) 
Argentina 3 federal, provincial, 24 2218 1,654,436 18,804 35 39 6645 
municipality/department 
Bolivia* 4 national, department, 9 32? 1,058,27? 29,126 26 32 1378 
municipality/canton 
Brazil 3 federal, state, municipal 2? 5564 7,041,481 34,169 12 39 7013 
Chile 3 national, region, municipality (15) 345 1,109,075 48,220 39 34 9851 
Colombia 3 national, department, 
municipality 
32 1102 1,386,232 40,253 23 35 4684 
Costa Rica 3 national, canton (?) 81 636,968 55,046 46 29 5891 
Dominican Republic* "3 national, province, municipality (32) 155 306,67? 63,314 32 22 4210 
Ecuador 3 national, province, canton 22 221 606,446 60,370 29 32 3432 
El Salvador 3 national, department, (14) 262 436,19? 23,3 08 39 23 3336 
municipality 
Guatemala 3 national, department, (22) 333 606,989 40,101 16 8 2548 
municipality 
Haiti 3 national, department, commune 10 140 97,008 6,929 45 21 640 
Honduras 3 national, department, 
municipality 
(18) 298 398,563 24,074 1671 
Jamaica 2 national, parish 14 191,128 4802 
Mexico 3 national, state, municipality 32 2454 3,290,016 42,902 23 34 9715 
Nicaragua 3 national, department, (1?) 153 35,003 3,889 1023 
municipality (+ 2 special regions) 
Panama 3 national, province/comarca, 14 75 238,810 44,577 53 38 5828 
district 
Paraguay 3 national, department, canton 17 231 360,390 26,989 51 30 1995 
Peru*" 3 national, region/special 26 1834 1,096,480 15,544 39 28 3771 
province, province/district 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 national, region/borough/city 16 83,013 16351 
Uruguay**** 2 national, department 19 89 174,942 37,34? 49 45 729? 
[municipality) 
Venezuela 3 national, state, municipality 24 335 1,145,125 82,038 12 32 8299 
Note: # computed using the number of jurisdictions in level. Between brackets when the authorities are not elected. 
* In Bolivia, there are departments, provinces (not elected authorities: 112), municipalities and territohes of traditional peoples "territorios indigenas 
originarios campesinos" (incorporated in the new constitution) 
** In the Dominican Republic, recent constitution reforms recognize 229 municipal districts as local governments 
*** In Peru, are two kinds of municipalities: provincials and districts. 
**** in Uruguay, municipalities were created in 2009 by constitutional reform. 
Sources: UCLG data collection, World Bank 
United Cities and Local Governments 
identifying particular country experiences 
as lessons of what needs to be avoided or 
what may be replicated. 
density, little administrative capacity and 
lacking an appropriate scale for the pro­
vision of many basic public services. 
9. In the case of Bolivia, 
the provincial level 
may not be interpreted 
as an additional 
autonomous level. 
10. A recent law in that 
country has imposed 
stricter requirements 
for new potential 
municipalities 
requiring that they 
have 15,000 residents 
and be able to 
generate at least 10 
percent of the revenue 
that their previous 
municipality was 
raising. 
The Structure of Local Governments 
As a rule the vertical structure of govern­
ment in Latin America is organized in three 
tiers of government (Table 6.1), with the 
exceptions of Bolivia that has four levels, 
and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago that 
have two levels9. The focus of this paper 
will be almost exclusively on the lowest 
tier of government: the municipalities. The 
intermediate levels (States, provinces, 
regions and departments) will be referred 
to only in issues relevant to the muni­
cipalities. 
As of 2010, there were over 16,000 mu­
nicipal governments in Latin America. 
Their number by country obviously varies 
with population size and territory, with 
Brazil counting 5,564 municipalities and at 
the other extreme 16 municipalities for 
Trinidad and Tobago. Local governments 
vary considerably in size in each country 
(Table 6.1). 
Even though a significant share of the 
Latin American countries' population live 
in the largest cities (for example, 53 
percent in Panama, 49 percent in 
Uruguay, 40 percent in Peru, and 35 
percent in Argentina), the majority of 
municipalities in the region remain, for 
the most part, small in size and of a rural 
nature. For example, in Peru over 200 
municipalities have populations under 
1,000 inhabitants, and over 50 percent of 
all municipalities have fewer than 5,000 
inhabitants. Thus the region faces 
challenges at the two extremes: massive 
metropolises with high levels of 
population density, congestion and rings 
of urban poverty; and very small 
municipalities in rural areas with low 
In many Latin American countries the 
structure of local governments continues 
to be work in progress. In the case of 
Bolivia, the new 2009 Constitution 
declares autonomous governments at the 
regional, municipal, and indigenous 
community level, with the added facet that 
indigenous communities may fit in one or 
more municipalities or regions. The legal 
norms regulating this structure have not 
yet been enacted. The proliferation of new 
local governments, almost always through 
the fragmentation of existing ones, 
continues to be quite common in the 
region. For example in the Dominican 
Republic, between 1995 and 2006 the 
number of municipalities rose from 108 to 
155.10 
Local Expenditures and the Assignment 
of Competencies 
The scope of local government expen­
ditures: The local government share in 
total public expenditures and in GDP 
differs significantly by country but they 
are generally lower than those observed in 
other regions of the world. However, as 
shown in Figure 6.1, the share of the 
public sector in GDP as measured by total 
expenditures of the general government is 
rather high, and at levels above those of 
other countries in the world at similar 
levels of per capita income. This contrast 
of proportionately smaller local 
government sectors in otherwise larger 
overall public sectors may be explained 
first, by fewer functional expenditure 
responsibilities being assigned to local 
governments in comparison with other 
regions of the world, and second, by 
relatively lower levels of expenditure and 
service provisions in those expenditure 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy 
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Local Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP and General Government 
Sources: IMF, Ministries of Finance of Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru, UCLG data collection (cf. Annex 6.2) 
responsibilities actually assigned to local 
governments, as discussed below. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, there are large 
differences between the share of local 
governments in total public expenditures 
and the relative importance of local 
government expenditures in GDP. Among 
the most decentralized countries, as 
measured by the municipal share in total 
public expenditures are: Brazil, Ecuador, 
and Colombia11 at around 20 percent, 
followed by Peru and Bolivia at about 16 
percent and Chile with 12.8 percent. Two 
large federal countries, Argentina and 
Mexico stand at 8.8 percent and 6.5 per­
cent, respectively. At the low end we find 
unitary countries that are still highly 
centralized such as many Centro-American 
and Caribbean countries (from 7 percent 
in Salvador, to 1.7 percent in Panama 
and 0.9 percent in Jamaica and between 
them Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Costa Rica). 
Perhaps a more meaningful measure of 
local governments' role as providers of 
public services is the share of local ex­
penditures in overall GDP (Figure 6.1). 
This variable measures the percentage of 
national resources channelled through 
local governments. From this perspective, 
Brazil at 8.3 percent and Bolivia at 7.3 
percent, Colombia at 5.6 percent (see 
note 14) and Ecuador at 4.4 percent 
are currently the most municipally 
decentralized countries in the region, 
while Argentina, Peru, Chile and Mexico 
account for between 2 and 3 percent of the 
GDP. At the bottom stand more centralized 
countries: Paraguay, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Guatemala, and Jamaica, around 
1 percent of GDP. 
The assignment of expenditure compe­
tencies: Several features characterize ex­
penditure assignments in Latin American 
countries. First, with the exception of 
Argentina,12 all countries have explicit 
11. For Colombia, if 
departments as 
intermediate local 
governments are 
added to the 
municipalities, then in 
2008 local 
expenditures 
represent as much as 
29 percent of general 
government 
expenditure and 9.5 
of GDP. 
12. In Argentina, each 
province regulates 
the expenditure 
responsibilities of 
municipalities 
differently. The 
provinces, in general, 
tend to enumerate a 
set of general 
functions 
accompanied by a 
clause that may be 
used to expand local 
competencies. Much 
less frequently the 
provinces explicitly 
enumerate the 
functions that 
municipalities must 
fulfill or functions 
exclusively assigned 
to them. 
M 
United Cities and Local Governments 
13. There are some qualified 
exceptions to the rule. 
For example, in the case 
of Colombia there is no 
special law assigning 
expenditure 
responsibilities at 
different levels of 
government, but there 
are several laws (60 of 
1993 and 715 of2001) 
that specify certain norms 
regarding the assignment 
of competencies. 
14. A clear exception to this 
rule is Chile, where 
municipalities are 
circumscribed to a dosed 
list of functions. 
15. In El Salvador basic 
education and primary 
health are assigned to the 
local level, but actual 
service delivery works 
through special local 
mechanisms 
administrated jointly by 
the State, the 
communities and the 
private sector. 
16. On the whole these 
experiences appear to 
have been positive 
(Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico 
and Peru). In the case of 
Mexico some programs 
have been critiqued 
because of partisan 
interference by central 
authorities in the 
deployment of funds. 
17. Of significant importance 
is that just a handful of 
countries allow for the 
taxation of both urban 
and rural property. Those 
countries allowing only 
the taxation of urban 
property leave rural 
munidpalities in a 
disadvantage. Note that 
the property tax is still 
assigned to the El 
Salvador's central 
government and that 
there appears to be no 
property tax in the 
Dominican Republic, only 
a property transfer tax. 
18. A good example is the 
"patente muniapaT'in 
Chile which is paid 
annually at rate based on 
the dedared own capital 
assets. This tax is further 
discussed in the next 
section. 
19. In the cases of Brazil's 
ISS (tax on services) and 
Colombia's ICA (tax on 
trade and industry), 
munidpal collections 
exceed those from the 
property tax (IBI, 
impuesto sobre bienes 
inmuebles). The two 
countries'experiences 
with these taxes are also 
further discussed in the 
next section. 
assignments for municipalities in their 
national laws. In most countries, as shown 
in Annex 6.1, the expenditure assignments 
are defined in the country's constitution; 
otherwise, the assignments are specified 
in special laws, most commonly some form 
of municipal code.13 Often, in these formal 
assignments, municipalities are allowed to 
provide any services not specifically 
assigned to any other level of 
government.14 
Second, there are enormous variations in 
the assignment of responsibilities to muni­
cipalities; the assignments represent a 
mosaic of approaches, which as shown in 
Annex 6.1 defy generalization. Most coun­
tries provide for a set of obligatory func­
tions, often exclusively assigned to 
municipalities. These range from basic 
urban services such as garbage collection, 
road maintenance, parks, market stalls 
and slaughter houses, and so on, as well 
as some administrative functions such as, 
civil registry, land planning, and housing 
permits. In addition, most countries 
provide voluntary functions, which often 
are co-shared with other levels of 
government. These may include some 
social services, such as basic education, 
primary health services, and public 
utilities, such as water and sewerage 
services. But as can be seen in Annex 6.1, 
in some countries (Colombia, Guatemala, 
Jamaica) basic education and primary 
health can also be designated as 
obligatory and exclusive responsibilities of 
local governments.15 
Third, in some countries (for example, 
Bolivia and Chile) the central 
governments, while retaining the obligation 
of financing social welfare services (such 
as social security, unemployment 
compensation, and welfare payments), 
have delegated the implementation and 
management of several social programs 
(e.g., family welfare services) to local 
governments in order to exploit the 
advantage of proximity and better information 
local governments have.16 Municipal 
governments in many Latin American countries 
play a large role in the public investment 
of infrastructure at the sub-national level 
often as equal partners with upper level 
governments in patterns similar to those 
observed in European countries. For 
example, in Brazil local governments in 
recent years have undertaken close to 45 
percent of all public sector investments. 
Finally, many countries in Latin America 
have concurrent or shared expenditure 
responsibilities, which generally results in 
less clarity and potentially more conflict 
than exclusive assignments. 
Revenue Assignments 
Practically all countries of Latin America assign 
certain taxes to local governments; some 
exceptions are Jamaica, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. As shown in Table 6.2, the most 
commonly assigned type is the property 
tax, although it varies in name and scope 
across countries.17 Other local taxes include 
betterment levies, car registration and car 
permits, real estate and land transfers, different 
forms of business licenses,18 taxes on gambling, 
and in some form of sales tax or business tax.19 
Practically all local governments are allowed to 
charge fees for particular public services such 
as building licenses, refuse collection, public 
utilities, slaughter houses, and public markets. 
Revenue assignments are formalized in 
different ways, usually in the general tax 
laws or in special municipal laws. The 
exceptions are Brazil, where it is established 
in its national constitution, and Argentina 
and Mexico, where the constitution 
delegates to the provinces or states the 
authority to determine local revenue 
assignments. This arrangement results in 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy 
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Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments in Latin America 
Type of Tax Type of Fees 
Country Property Others 
Argentina urban/rural property (and its increased value 
because of public investment)"1 
car registration, turnover tax public utilities, fines 
Bolivia urban/rural property car registration, car/property transfers, 
slaughterhouse, construction 
Brazil urban property (including increased value due 
to infrastructure improvement) 
tax on service sector (ISS), registered goods 
tax, real estate transaction tax121 
fines, public utilities 
Chile urban property car registration, alcohol public utilities, fines, permits 
Colombia urban property (and its increased value 
because of public investment] 
surtax on gasoline, tax on industry/commerce, 
mineral extraction, slaughterhouse, gambling 
public utilities, fines 
Costa Rica urban property public utilities 
Ecuador urban/rural (and its increased value because 
public infrastructure investment) 
car tags, permits (business, construction), fines, utilities 
El Salvador Specific taxes for each municipality based on 
congress approval such as business taxes on 
industrial, trade, and financial activities 
fines, public utilities, fees for services rendered 
Guatemala urban property"1 tax on wages, advertising (banners), extraction of 
products/economic activity, alcohol 
Honduras urban/rural property (and its increased value 
because of public investment) 
tax on turnover of industry and trade, extraction 
of natural resources (fishing, minerals, oil), 
slaughterhouses 
public utilities, firefighters, fines 
Jamaica Parochial revenue fund 
Mexico Urban property Car registration (all other taxes are 
centralized) 
Varies by state 
Nicaragua Urban/Rural property Sales tax (recently eliminated); patents and 
business licenses 
fines, public utilities 
Panama tax on unused land (urban/rural) tax on alcohol, economic activity and vehicles fines, fees (cattle slaughter) 
Paraguay urban property (and its increased value 
because of public investment) 
car registration, games/gambling, wealth tax 
(corporate), land transfers/subdivision 
public utilities 
United Cities and Local Governments 
Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments in Latin America (cont.) I 
Type ofTax Type of Fees 
Countnj Property Others 
Peru urban/rural property car registration, car transfer, 
construction 
public utilities, fines 
Uruguay urban property (and its increased value 
because of public investment) 
car registration, gambling, shows fines, fees for services 
Venezuela urban/rural property car tags, gambling, economic activity fines, fees for services 
Notes: 
1. Argentina: Not all provinces have delegated property taxes to their municipalities 
2. Brazil: The ISS is assessed and collected by the municipality at rates set by the municipality but subject to a maximum fixed by federal law 
3. Tax collection authority is only given to local governments that prove to have the capacity to collect the tax 
20. In the case of Mexico, 
the constitution assigns 
only the real estate tax 
to the municipalities. 
21. In Argentina, some 
provinces may also 
allow their local 
governments to 
introduce new taxes 
but under quite 
restrictive guidelines. 
22. <4s an exception, it 
appears that in Bolivia 
all local taxes are 
collected and 
administered by the 
central authorities. 
a variety of de facto assignments in those two 
countries.20 
The level of autonomy granted to local 
governments also varies. As summarized 
in Table 6.3, most countries use a "closed 
list" approach and do not allow the intro­
duction of new taxes to local govern­
ments; some exceptions include Ecuador 
and Uruguay.21 On the other hand, about 
two-thirds of the countries in the region 
allow local governments the ability to set 
the rates of some taxes; this practice is 
widely accepted as the most desirable 
form of tax autonomy that can be granted 
to local governments. It is interesting 
that countries such as Bolivia and Peru, 
where decentralization reforms have 
advanced rapidly in recent years, still 
grant no discretion to set tax rates. A re­
duced number of countries in the region 
grant local discretion to modify tax base. 
Most countries in the region allow local 
government discretion in fixing the levels 
of fees and user charges for local 
government services. Nevertheless, an 
important restriction on the revenue 
autonomy of local governments is the 
practice by several countries to require 
local government revenue budgets ("plan 
de arbitrios") to be previously approved 
by a higher tier of government prior to 
the start of the fiscal year. Table 6.3 
shows this is still practiced in Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay; in 
Mexico approval comes at the inter­
mediate level from state governments. In 
terms of fiscal administration (Table 6.3), 
the general rule is local government is 
responsible for the administration of local 
taxes, fees and charges, although in some 
cases, tax administration responsibility is 
shared with the central authorities.22 
In most countries in the region, the 
yield from property tax remains far below 
its potential (Figure 6.2). While on 
average property taxes raise revenues 
representing 2.12 percent of GDP in OECD 
countries, 0.68 percent in transition 
countries, and 0.60 percent in developing 
countries, the average yield in Latin 
America is only 0.37 percent of GDP. 
The reasons for low performance are 
multiple, including low political will from 
national governments, local governments, 
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Autonomy Granted in Revenue Assignments to Local Governments and 
Responsibility for the Collection and Administration of Local Taxes and Fees 
Country Ability to Ability to Ability to Control or veto over Responsibility for 
introduce set tax rates change local govt, budgets by the collection of 
new taxes within legal limits tax base Central/Regional govt. Fees Taxes 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes No L L 
Bolivia No No No Central C/R C 
Brazil Yes Yes Yes No L L 
Chile No Yes Yes No L L 
Colombia No Yes No No L C 
Costa Rica No No No Central PS* PS* 
Dominican Republic No No No No C c 
Ecuador Yes Yes No No L L 
El Salvador Yes Yes No No L L 
Guatemala No Yes No No L 01 
Haiti na na na na na C 
Honduras No Yes No No L L 
Jamaica No Yes Yes Central L C/L 
Mexico No No No Regional L L 
Nicaragua No Yes Yes Central L L 
Panama No Yes No Central L C/L 
Paraguay No No No Central L C/L 
Peru No No No No L L 
Trinidad and Tobago No No No No L C/L 
Uruguay Yes Yes No Central L L 
Venezuela Yes Yes Yes No L L 
Note *: Costa Rica collects, in some municipalities, through the private sector. 
L= local, C= central, R=reglonal, PS= private sector 
a United Cities and Local Governments 
IIHIIUM Average Property Tax Revenue Raised as a Percentage of GDP § 
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Sources: IMF, Ministries of Finances of Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru, UCLG data collection, (cf. Annex 6.2) 
23. For a discussion of the 
issues, see Sepulveda 
and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2009) and De Cesare 
and Lazo Marin (2008). 
24. These two effects are 
compatible if we recall 
our discussion in the 
previous section that 
local government 
budgets represent a 
relatively small share 
of the general 
government budget. 
Parliament and the disincentive effects of 
revenue sharing and inter-governmental 
fiscal transfers (IGFTs), not to mention 
outdated and poorly equipped tax 
administrations. These factors translate 
into generous exemptions and low tax 
rates, obsolete and infrequent property 
value assessments, incomplete registries 
and cadastres and a lack of willingness 
and means to enforce collections. This 
lacklustre performance varies little 
with the different arrangements in the 
region for discretion on rate setting or 
administering property tax.23 
Generally, the range of locally raised 
revenues from own taxes and fees repre­
sent a relatively small share of total consoli­
dated revenues in the public sector, 
although in terms of local budget shares, 
these revenues are relatively large.24 Of 
course there is a large variation in execution 
from country to country. Figure 6.3 shows 
that as percent of national GDP, local 
governments in Brazil raise 8.2 percent, 
Bolivia 7.7 percent, Colombia 5.2 percent. 
Ecuador and Peru stay at 3.8 - 3.7 percent 
followed by Guatemala and Chile 2.8 - 2.7 
percent and then Argentina and Mexico 2.5 
Second Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy 
GOLD 2010 
2) Shares of Local Own Revenues (in percentages) 
Country (Most recent year) Own taxes and fees Local own taxes 
as * of local revenues and fees as 1> of GDP 
Argentina(2006] 49.8 1.2 
Bolivia(2008) 11.4 27 
Brazil(200?) 20.1 1.8 
Chile(200?) 63.0 07 
Colombia(2006) 41.2 2.1 
Dominican Republic(2006] 58.4 07 
Ecuador(200?) 34.6 1.6 
El Salvador(200?J 13.2 0.3 
Haitij 2004) 25.0 0.5 
Honduras(2004) 11.1 0.2 
Jamaica(2008] 100.0 0.2 
Mexico(200?) 15.6 2.4 
Nicaragua(2002) 44.0 0.6 
Panama(2005) 49.0 0.3 
Paraguay(2006) 34.1 1.2 
Peru(2008) 43.2 2.6 
Trinidad and Tobago( 1995) 52.9 0.1 
Sources: UCLG data collection. 
- 2.1 respectively. At the lower end stand El 
Salvador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
and Jamaica (less than 2 percent).25 
However, on average, municipalities raise 
a higher percentage of their budgets from 
their own revenues similar to Africa, Asia 
and a good portion of European countries. 
As shown in Table 6.4, the percentage of 
local budgets financed out of their own 
taxes and fees is quite high, at or above 25 
percent for many countries.26 However, in 
Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Mexico the share is much lower in relation 
to the other countries in the region. 
Intergovernmental Transfers 
As a result of limited fiscal autonomy, 
practically all local governments suffer 
from vertical imbalances, i.e. the expen­
diture needs arising from their functional 
competences exceed their ability to self 
finance. Although the existence of vertical 
imbalance is not in dispute, their actual 
measure is generally a polemical issue 
because practically no country in the re­
gion has introduced explicit methodologies 
to measure the expenditure needs of local 
governments in a transparent and objec­
tive manner. In order to address the exis­
ts. See Annex 6.2 for the 
breakdown of 
revenues collected by 
each tier of 
government. 
26. See Annex 6.3 in the 
Appendix for the 
breakdown of sources 
for revenues of local 
governments. 
0 United Cities and Local Governments 
27. In some cases, like in 
Paraguay, the 
allocation of funds is 
still ad-hoc at the 
discretion of the 
central authorities. 
ting vertical imbalances, practically all 
countries in the region should implement a 
range of fiscal transfers, often consisting 
of different forms of revenue sharing, an 
array of specific or conditional grants, and 
in some cases, equalization grants. 
In addition to vertical imbalances, in prac­
tically all countries in the region there are 
also significant horizontal imbalances 
between local governments. These imba­
lances are the result of the different tax 
capacities and economic development of 
local governments, and the different ex­
penditure needs arising from disparities in 
the service delivery costs and the differing 
resident populations' needs arising from 
their diverse characteristics. Horizontal 
imbalances are most pronounced between 
urban and rural municipalities and 
between smaller and larger urban centers. 
As we see later, different approaches are 
used in the region to address these 
horizontal imbalances. 
The emphasis throughout the region has 
been to address the problem of vertical 
imbalances through different forms of 
revenue sharing via central government 
tax collections. There has been less 
emphasis on the design of explicit equali­
zation grants, although, quite often, reve­
nue sharing formulas contain equalization 
features. Conditional grants are less 
common in Latin America than in other re­
gions of the world, but here again there 
are important exceptions. 
Most countries in the region use some 
form of general revenue sharing. The pool 
of funds to be shared is most frequently 
defined by total central government 
revenues, although in some cases 
particular taxes are excluded from the 
pool. This is the case for Bolivia, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. In other cases, the pool is 
based on specific central government 
taxes; for example, 20 percent of oil 
production fees derived by the Mexican 
states must be passed on to their mu­
nicipalities; Nicaragua's additional tax 
sharing with municipalities is based on 
revenues from natural resources; and in 
Peru, some of the tax sharing is from 
portions of the sales tax, and proceeds 
from gas and oil extractions (canon, 
sobrecanon, and canon petrolero). In the 
latter, actual shared revenues are subject 
to considerable market fluctuations, for 
example, international price levels for 
natural resources. 
In some cases, shared revenues are 
distributed on a derivation (i.e. origin) 
b a s i s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  c a n o n ,  
sobrecanon, and canon petrolero in Peru. 
This approach (sharing revenues from 
natural resources on a derivation basis) 
has become a significant factor for 
regional horizontal fiscal imbalances. Most 
often some sort of formula is used for the 
distribution of resources that includes 
several variables, some of which, as noted 
above, may have equalizing features.27 For 
example, in Bolivia revenue sharing is 
based solely on population; in Ecuador it 
is according to population and relative 
poverty levels; in El Salvador it is 
according to population, "equity" (a fixed 
amount for each municipality), poverty, 
and land surface area; in Guatemala it is 
distributed according to a formula that 
includes equal shares (fixed amounts), 
population, number of settlements, and 
per capita income; in Honduras it is 
according to population and equal 
amounts for all municipalities; in 
Nicaragua it is according to population and 
several other criteria; and in Peru it is 
according to population and infant 
mortality rates. Frequently, the formulas 
are also employed by central governments 
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Composition of Local Government Revenue 
Source: UCLG data collection, (cf. Annex 6.6) 
to pursue several objectives other than 
equalization. For example, in Ecuador the 
sharing formula includes elements for 
rewarding administrative effort and 
achieving goals in the national 
development plan, while in Nicaragua the 
formula provides incentives for increasing 
revenues from property tax and for 
achieving more effective budget execution. 
Some countries allow unconditional use of 
shared revenue, including Bolivia, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, and Honduras. In other cases 
the use of funds is conditional; Colombia 
uses revenue sharing funds earmarked 
for basic education, health, and water and 
sewerage; Guatemala, for education, health 
and infrastructure; while in Nicaragua and 
Paraguay, a share of the funds -80 percent 
in the latter case- must be spent on 
infrastructure investment. 
Revenue sharing practices in the federal 
countries also have different features. In 
Argentina, tax sharing with local govern­
ments is carried out exclusively by the 
provincial governments, which can decide 
how to distribute their share of federal VAT 
and income taxes. The Brazilian states also 
have a tax sharing system funded with 25 
percent of their regional VAT revenues, 
which distributed 75 percent on a derivation 
basis according to value added in the 
municipalities, and 25 percent by a formula 
based on population, land area, and other 
variables. This same formula is used to 
distribute federal tax sharing with the 
states (cooperation funds) to the munici­
palities. In Mexico, the states are required 
to distribute to their municipalities at least 
20 percent of the income that they receive 
from revenue sharing in the federal funds 
(Fondo de Fiscalizacion and Fondo General 
United Cities and Local Governments 
28. Here we are referring 
in a conventional way 
to specific funds 
assigned to particular 
objectives and 
administered 
separately by central 
government agencies. 
This is interpreted as 
being different from 
the conditioning or 
earmarking of revenue 
sharing funds. As we 
have seen above, a 
number of countries in 
the region condition 
the use of revenue 
sharing funds to 
investment in 
infrastructure and so 
on. If the restrictions 
in the use of revenue 
sharing funds were 
included in the general 
category of conditional 
transfers then the 
practices in the 
regions would not be 
that different from 
those in other regions 
of the world. 
29. This is a specific 
instance of larger 
developmental goals 
that can be addressed 
by conditional 
transfers, such as arid 
areas, poor areas, 
unexploited high 
potential areas, etc. 
de participaciones). Mexico also has a 
federal grant, amounting to 1 percent of 
federal collections (Fondo de Fomento 
Municipal) that is distributed on the basis 
of municipal revenue collections. 
Conditional or specific transfers are less 
extensively used in Latin American than in 
other regions of the world,28 nevertheless 
their use is increasing, especially in those 
countries where central governments 
count on being associated with local 
governments as partners for the delivery 
of certain services and the implementation 
of national programs. For example, Bolivia 
has introduced a conditional health trans­
fer for a national program in support of 
infants and mothers (seguro materno in-
fantil). In Brazil, several conditional grants 
have been introduced for public transport 
(funded by the sharing of federal fuel 
levies), basic education, and health 
services, including hospitals from the 
national health system. In Chile several 
highly conditional grants have for many 
years funded local governments' activities 
in education, health, and other social 
programs. Some conditional grants are 
earmarked for certain geographical areas 
that are deemed to be lagging behind. For 
example, in Ecuador there is a conditional 
capital investment grant for the Amazon 
region.29 
A particular subgroup of conditional grants 
is earmarked for investment in local infra­
structure. For example, El Salvador offers 
grants for municipal capital infrastructure 
based on the presentation of project 
proposals. In Guatemala one-eighth of 
VAT revenues go to infrastructure in social 
and basic services, while a share of vehicle 
taxes is earmarked for maintenance of 
roads and drainage. In Mexico, at least 20 
percent of the investment grants (Fondo 
de Compensacion) from the federal 
government must be assigned to the 
poorest ten states in the country and used 
by the municipalities of those states. 
The practice of explicitly addressing hori­
zontal disparities among local governments 
through equalization transfers is still not 
common but it is taking hold in the region. 
One reason for the slow introduction of 
explicit equalization grants is that often 
revenue sharing schemes do incorporate 
some equalization elements in their 
allocation formulas. Several examples of 
existing equalization grants (above and 
beyond revenue sharing schemes with some 
equalizing elements in their formulas) are 
worth mentioning. One is Bolivia's HIPC 
(Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) 
transfers started in 1997 with funds from 
international organizations (the World Bank 
and the IMF) that is distributed by the 
central government to local governments 
using a formula based on the poverty level 
and population of municipalities. In Brazil, 
there is a federal equalization transfer to the 
municipalities funded with a share of federal 
VAT and income tax revenues; the fund is 
split into two parts, with 10 percent going to 
state capital municipalities (distributed 
according to population and the inverse of 
per capita income) and the other 90 percent 
to the rest of the municipalities (distributed 
according to an index that favours munici­
palities with smaller populations). An 
interesting approach is that of Chile, where 
the formula driven equalization grant (the 
Common Municipal Fund) is funded by the 
municipalities' own revenues from different 
sources in what is known in the technical 
parlance as a "fraternal" (or Robin Hood) 
system, in which the relatively richer 
municipalities finance the transferred 
amounts to the poorer municipalities. The 
allocation formula includes population size, 
poverty levels, exempted real estate 
property, and past revenue collections. One 
key positive feature in all these examples is 
the recognition of the need to introduce a 
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Country 
Argentina Y Y Y 
Bolivia Y NY 
Brazil Y NY 
Chile N N n.a 
Colombia Y n.a Y 
Costa Rica Y n.a n.a 
Dominican Republic N Y Y 
Ecuador N Y Y 
El Salvador N Y Y 
Guatemala Y n.a Y 
Haiti n.a n.a n.a 
Honduras Y Y Y 
Jamaica N Y 
Mexico Y N Y 
Nicaragua Y n.a Y 
Panama n.a n.a n.a 
Paraguay Y N n.a 
Peru Y N Y 
Trinidad and Tobago N n.a 
Uruguay Y N Y 
Venezuela Y Y na 
Source: UCLG data collection. 
Authority to Borrow by Local Governments in Latin America 
Access to Financial Markets Municipal Bank Limitations 
separate instrument (equalization grants) to 
address the separate objective of horizontal 
inequalities arising from different 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.30 A 
key common challenge ahead is the need to 
improve the methodologies used to quantify 
the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of 
the different local governments.31 
Borrowing 
Given their expenditure responsibilities, 
most municipalities have a long-term 
need to finance capital infrastructure. 
Local borrowing can be considered a 
legitimate, efficient, and equitable source 
for financing this local infrastructure. 
However, it is also widely accepted that 
the local borrowing process must be 
subject to explicit rules and limitations in 
order to ensure fiscally responsible 
behavior by local officials and to guarantee 
macroeconomic stability in the country.32 
Commonly applied rules include those 
about expected behavior, such as the 
"golden rule" that long-term borrowed 
funds must be used for capital infra­
structure only, and not for recurrent 
30. The use of a fraternal 
system to fund the 
equalization transfers 
in Chile is a promising 
innovation. This is a 
common system to a 
number of European 
countries but it is 
uncertain how easily it 
will be adopted by 
other countries in the 
region. 
31. For the available 
methodologies used in 
other regions of the 
world see, for 
example, Martinez-
Vazquez and Searle 
(2007). 
32. Historically this wasn't 
always widely 
accepted in some 
countries in the region, 
which in past decades 
saw an accumulation 
of macroeconomic 
difficulties associated 
with unfettered sub-
national borrowing in 
some of the 
federations and 
politicized 
govemment-run 
municipal 
development banks. 
United Cities and Local Governments 
33. The exceptions include 
Chile, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, 
Ecuador, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
34. For example, foreign 
borrowing by the 
municipalities in 
Argentina requires 
administrative 
approval at the 
provincial level and by 
the Ministry of 
Economy at the 
national level, which it 
has been argued has 
been subject to 
political criteria 
beyond technical 
aspects. 
35. See Porto (2009). 
expenditures, and different quantitative 
budgetary limits on borrowing. Among the 
latter, there are rules on non-negative 
current budget balances, limits on the 
level of total debt and debt-service 
payments as a percent of budget 
revenues, as well as restrictions on 
borrowing abroad. 
For a variety of reasons, ranging from 
fiscal conservatism to negative past expe­
rience, not all countries in the world allow 
their local governments to borrow. Yet in 
the case of Latin America, as shown in 
Table 6.5, most countries do allow local 
governments to borrow.33 Practically all 
countries allow such borrowing even 
though they impose rules and limitations 
on local borrowing similar to the 
above-mentioned international "good 
practice" guidelines. In most cases, 
foreign borrowing is not allowed, in 
some cases it is allowed with 
permission of the higher authorities, and 
in other cases even domestic borrowing 
requires administrative approval by higher 
level authorities.34 Over time, national 
systems have adapted to idiosyncrasies. 
For example, in Nicaragua, municipalities 
are able to contract short or medium term 
loans from public and private banks for 
public works, with long-term loans for 
large-scale public works approved by the 
National Assembly. Loans must be repaid 
within the term of the elected officials; 
mayors and municipal councils may not 
leave debts to their successors, except for 
long-term loans approved by the National 
Assembly. In Colombia, law 358 from 1997 
introduced a system of "semaforos" 
(traffic light) restricting the level of local 
debt according to the ability to pay by the 
local units; if interest payments are below 
40 percent of the operational surplus and 
if the debt level is under 80 percent of 
current revenues, local governments are 
free to borrow according to the law; 
however, they require permission from 
the Ministry of Finance if any of those 
limits is exceeded. With law 819, which 
came into effect in 2003, the need to have 
a primary surplus sufficient to cover on 
going debt service was added to the 
existing indicators. The three indicators 
must be positive in every year of the loan, 
and this must be reflected in the medium 
term fiscal framework of the municipality 
or department. In El Salvador, munici­
palities can borrow from commercial banks 
once they receive the proper quality 
ranking from the Ministry of Finance and 
the semi-official organization charged with 
the physical distribution of the general 
transfer funds. The municipalities then 
establish an intercept agreement for those 
transfers to work as collateral for the loans 
from the commercial banks. As in other 
countries around the world, it is common 
to impose limits on annual debt service as 
percent of revenues (for example 20 
percent in Argentina and Bolivia or 40 
percent in Ecuador) and/or the total stock 
of debt as percent of total revenues (120 
percent in Brazil or under 100 percent in 
Ecuador and Peru). 
The actual amount of sub-national debt, 
which includes local and provincial/state 
debt, is quite low in most countries, with 
the exception of Brazil and Argentina, 
where sub-national debt represents in 
recent times between 10 and 15 percent 
of GDP; Mexico, Colombia and Bolivia 
come behind with sub-national govern­
ment debt representing less than 2 per­
cent of GDP as of 2007. However, for 
municipal governments alone in recent 
years, Bolivia is first in debt service 
(interest and repayment of principal) at 
around 9 percent of total municipal 
expenditures, followed by Ecuador at 
around 8 percent, and Argentinean and 
Brazilian municipalities, where debt service 
stands at around 4 percent.35 
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Budgeting 
The budgeting process at the local level in 
most Latin American countries is still carried 
out along traditional lines with heavy 
emphasis on incremental budgeting and 
ex-ante financial audit controls for the 
disbursement of funds. Much less attention 
is given to the planning of expenditure 
programs and ex-post evaluation of the 
effectiveness of funds disbursed on 
programmatic goals.36 One positive aspect 
without exception is, local budgets need to 
be approved by democratically elected local 
councils. However, as we have seen above, 
in a significant number of countries (Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay) at least some 
components of the local budgets need to be 
approved ex-ante by higher level authorities 
at the central or regional levels. It is 
questionable whether or not these 
approvals are really needed; the best 
practice internationally is to rely on 
horizontal accountability mechanisms 
ex-ante, and on the ex-post audit and to 
grant full budgetary autonomy to local 
governments.37 
"Participatory budgeting" is an area of 
innovation in the region that has attracted 
much international attention. The specific 
meaning of this term varies among countries 
introducing this type of reform, but generally 
means additional mechanisms for citizens to 
influence local budgetary decisions beyond 
the conventional vehicle of democratic 
elections for municipal councilors.38 For 
example, in Bolivia a 1994 law 
established citizen committees (comites de 
vigilancia) and community-based organizations 
(OTBs—organizaciones de base), that are 
social organizations of peasant communities, 
the indigenous population, and neighborhood 
groups. Citizen participation at the local level 
is also important in Brazil, but varies 
considerably across states and municipalities. 
One experiment involves groups of citizens 
empowered to address social and 
political inequalities by influencing the 
allocation of budget resources through 
neighbourhood meetings.39 Even some 
provinces in Argentina, have formally 
adopted participatory budgeting.40 On the 
other hand, participatory budgeting is 
generally appropriate for only certain 
elements of the budget; thus, even in Porto 
Alegre (Brazil) the share of the budget 
subject to this process is limited (see Box 
6.6). Nevertheless, the implementation of 
participative budgeting often depends on 
the will of the Mayor and the City Council 
since it is not a compulsory or permanent 
tool. 
As for the composition of municipal 
budgets, our discussion is based on a 
small number of countries where data 
availability varies. In terms of the econo­
mic classification of local expenditures, 
the high share of capital infrastructure ex­
penditures in the municipal budgets of a 
significant number of countries is notable 
(Figure 6.5). For example, in both Chile 
and Ecuador, local governments spend 55 
percent of their budgets on capital 
expenditures; in Guatemala this figure is 
64 percent and in Peru, 58 percent. Of 
course, there are large variations for these 
figures across countries, including the 
assignment of expenditure responsibi­
lities—what tier of government is respon­
sible for capital infrastructure in the 
different areas of responsibility: schools, 
roads, etc -and the legal restrictions 
imposed on local governments for how to 
spend revenue sharing and other types of 
funds— as in Peru, where local govern­
ments only can spend funds from the 
canon and sobrecanon from natural 
resources on capital investments. There is 
also the possibility that capital expen­
ditures are over reported.41 Whatever the 
explanation, it is clear that many local 
36. The strong emphasis 
on ex-ante treasury 
controls has not, on the 
other hand, reduced 
corruption, which, with 
some exceptions, still 
appears to be extensive 
among local 
governments (and the 
rest of the public 
sector) in the region. 
The difficulbes lie more 
in poor execubon of the 
ex-ante controls than in 
a deficient design. 
37. In some cases controls 
for checking the legality 
of actions, as opposed 
to changing budget 
allocabon decisions, 
can be justified when 
horizontal 
accountability and audit 
mechanisms are 
deficient or not present 
at all. 
38. Somewhat related, 
citizen participation 
mechanisms such as 
referendums, "popular 
initiatives," and elected 
representative recalls 
have been operating in 
other regions of the 
world. 
39. See Afonso (2006). 
40. For a positive 
assessment in the case 
of Bolivia, see Faguet 
(2004). See also 
Goldfrank (2006) and 
Shah (2007) for 
general assessments. 
41. There are incentives in 
many countries in the 
region to report some 
current expenditure as 
capital expenditure. For 
example, in some cases 
central legislation 
restricts the share of 
budgets that can go to 
recurrent purposes. In 
other cases, practically 
all kinds of current 
expenditures have 
been demonized as 
being inefficient so local 
authorities actually 
report some current 
expenditure as actually 
being some form of 
capital expenditure. 
But, fortunately there 
does not appear to be a 
problem in Latin 
America with the off-
budget programs and 
expenditures that are 
common in other 
regions of the world, for 
example Africa and 
Asia. 
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governments in Latin America have been 
given an important role to play in the task 
of providing much needed infrastructure. 
This highlights the importance of finding 
more stable and potent instruments for 
infrastructure finance. 
As we have seen, the movement toward 
open and participatory budgeting is 
spreading, increasing budget efficiency and 
accountability in general. Although parti­
cipatory budgeting is not directly about 
decentralization itself, the movement 
toward participatory budgeting has tended 
to reinforce decentralized institutions. There 
are, however, exceptions; for example, in 
the Dominican Republic, Law 176 of 2007 
goes a long way to introduce participatory 
budgeting but the actual level of decentra­
lization to local governments in that country 
remains quite weak. 
Even less data are available to obtain a 
panoramic view of the functional 
classification of local budgets in the 
region; for countries where individual 
municipalities' data are available, 
comparisons are hard because of the 
different classification methods used in 
each country. As shown in Figure 6.6, 
education expenditures, deriving from the 
assignment of expenditure competencies, 
are important items in the local budgets of 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. For the 
same reason, expenditures on health 
services are relatively important in the 
local budgets of Brazil, Colombia, and 
Peru, with budget shares here ranging 
between 16 and 22 percent. It is note­
worthy that in most of these countries for 
which disaggregated data are available, 
not surprisingly "general administration" is 
the most important expenditure item in 
terms of budget shares. 
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Special Issues, Constraints and 
Opportunities for Local 
and Intergovernmental Finance 
in the Region 
As shown in the introductory section, the 
Latin American region offers a vast array 
of different experiences and approaches to 
local finance. The kinds of issues facing 
local governments in large federal countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are 
often very different from those affecting 
local governments in small countries such 
as El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Paraguay. 
Furthermore, there is also significant di­
versity among the large federal countries 
as well as among the unitary countries. 
Hence, the attempt to generalize analysis 
of local problems and their solutions is 
neither always possible nor desirable. 
Nevertheless, some themes common to a 
significant number of countries in the re­
gion clearly emerge from the description 
of the local finance system presented in 
Section 1. In this section we identify some 
of the special issues, constraints and 
opportunities for the development of local 
finance in Latin America. It is organized 
around four major themes: (a) Or­
ganizational Structure; (b) Intergovern­
mental Fiscal System Design; (c) Budget 
Process and Transparency; and (d) Short 
Term and Long Term Structural Challenges. 
Issues on Organizational Structure 
Fragmentation and sub-optimal scale42 
In many countries there is an ongoing 
debate on the number and size of local 
governments related to the issues of 
economies of scales to deliver public 
services, which typically improve with size, 
and citizen representation, which generally 
deteriorates with size. Citizens that feel 
marginalized frequently call for the 
42. The issues of local 
fragmentation and 
administrative 
capacity have a 
significant political 
component and from 
that perspective they 
were reviewed in 
GOLD I. Our main 
perspective here is on 
how fragmentation 
and administrative 
capacity may affect 
the fiscal sustainability 
of local governments. 
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43. For example, in El 
Salvador, the Fund for 
Economic and Social 
Development (FODES), 
which is the main source 
of local revenues, is 
distributed according to a 
formula that distributes 
25 percent of the funds 
evenly to all 
municipalities. 
44. However, these 
programs can be difficult 
to implement. For 
example, in El Salvador, 
the National Plan for 
Territorial Development 
and Organization 
(PNODT) was supposed 
to promote mancomuni-
dades and general 
cooperation among local 
governments which 
would allow them to 
lower administrative 
costs by working 
together to print jointly 
needed forms and 
gathering regularly to 
share ideas. However, 
the results are very 
limited. 
45. Other approaches to 
dealing with the problem 
of inadequate scale 
include the contracting 
out to private companies 
of some services, so that 
private companies can 
benefit from sufficient 
scale by supplying 
different municipalities, 
or the creation of 'sector 
specific'service govern­
ments or districts. The 
privatization of services is 
being used in several 
Latin American countries. 
See Martinez-Vazquez 
and Gomez (2008) for a 
discussion of the issues 
and solutions. 
46. See Martinez-Vazquez 
and Gomez (2008) and 
Imansyah and Martinez-
Vazquez (2009) for a 
more extensive dis­
cussion o f this issue. 
47. The latin America region 
shows a lower prevalence 
for Ministries of Local 
Government/Inte­
rior/Home Affairs that are 
more prevalent in other 
regions of the world and 
have a higher presence 
of specialagencies 
designed to exclusively 
address the needs of 
local governments, such 
as ISEDM y F1SDL in El 
Salvador or INIFOM in 
Nicaragua. In general, it 
is easier for these types 
of specialized agencies to 
play a supporting and 
capacity development 
role than it is for sectoral 
ministries; the downside 
is that the specialized 
agencies tend to pull a 
lower rank within the 
government 
administrations in the 
bargain for additional 
resources. 
creation of new municipalities. As the current 
legal frameworks guarantee a minimum 
amount of funds to each municipality 
regardless of size, this has promoted the 
creation of new municipalities.43 In response 
to this problem some countries have 
introduced legislation requiring minimum 
population size in order to ensure the future 
fiscal viability of any new local government. 
This action can be effective in slowing down 
the process of further fragmentation but it 
does not help to address the inadequate 
scale of the already existing municipalities. 
Perhaps a more attractive and potentially 
equally effective approach is the promotion 
and creation of associations of municipali­
ties into mancomunidades for the delivery 
of certain public services requiring certain 
minimum scale.44 This is an approach still 
largely unexploited but it is currently being 
developed in some countries, especially in 
some provinces of Argentina, southern 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru.45 
The trade-off between economies of scale 
and representation46 
The issue of an optimal scale of local 
governments presents an inherent tradeoff 
between the (potential) better political 
connection in terms of representation and 
accountability of smaller jurisdictions with 
the (potential) greater fiscal viability of 
larger jurisdictions (in particular with regard 
to population size). 
The essence of this trade-off between the 
greater efficiency of smaller governments 
that can better match the preferences and 
needs of local residents in their expenditure 
allocation and economies of scale in 
production with lower costs associated 
with larger governments implies a 
compromise solution between the two 
objectives. In particular, it implies that lower 
cost effectiveness in the delivery of public 
services may be offset by greater efficiency 
in responding to the needs and preferences 
of local residents. 
Local administrative capacity 
The problem with local governments' 
administrative capacity is closely 
associated with their small size (in number of 
inhabitants). Central governments (or state 
or provincial governments in the case of 
federal countries) spend little time and 
resources in developing the capacity of 
local governments.47 Some of the slack has 
been taken up by local government 
associations, which, for example in some of 
the Andean countries and in Central America, 
provide their members with assistance and 
training. However, these associations often 
lack the resources necessary to address this 
issue. Central (or provincial-state) 
governments can do much more. 
To summarize, there are no exact answers 
or methodologies to address the issue of 
optimal size for municipalities. Several 
goals need to be pursued including cost 
efficiency and representation and 
accountability and several constraints 
need to be met regarding fiscal viability 
and administrative capacity. See Box 6.1. 
Issues on Intergovernmental Fiscal 
System Design 
Lack of clarity in the assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities to local 
governments 
One of the weakest points of many 
decentralization programs in Latin America 
has been the scant attention given to clear 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
of sub-national governments, which is a 
crucial first step in the design of any 
system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. Instead, the focus has been 
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Box 6.1. Four Possible Criteria to Consider for the Minimum Size of Municipalities 
Although the desirable minimum size of municipalities is a complex issue that must be 
addressed in the historical and political contexts of each country, there are four basic 
criteria that can be followed as guideline for policy decisions: 
(1) The production/cost efficiency/population criterion. The international experience 
shows that unit costs for some public services (such as water or public transportation) 
can be much affected by scale. Depending on the assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities, in order to arrive at the lowest cost of production it is required to reach 
a minimum size in terms of population. Yet we must note that there are other ways to 
provide services in a cost efficient manner, including buying the services from a larger 
local government, creating an association between several smaller local governments to 
produce the service, or even buying the services from a large privatized producer. What 
this means is that this criterion of a minimum population size should be administered 
intelligently with flexibility to allow for these other service delivery possibilities. 
(2) The representation/political responsiveness/accountability criterion. The general 
presumption is that smaller local governments will generally tend to be more 
representative and accountable to the residing population. But consideration must also 
be given to the fractionalization of the population and adequate representation of the 
minority groups' interest. Population density should also be considered. From an 
accountability and representative focus it would seem that a simple but useful rule of 
thumb will be the time required to travel to the location of the municipality building. 
(3) The financial/fiscal capacity criterion. It seems reasonable to require that any new 
local government have a minimum level of economic capacity to self finance some of its 
service needs. Measuring this capacity is not always an easy matter, but it should 
involve some approximation to the "expenditure needs" and the "fiscal capacity" of each 
potential municipality and the setting of some threshold for the difference between 
needs and capacity. 
(4) The administrative capacity criterion. This can be measured in a number of different 
ways, but fundamentally qualified personnel available to run the business of the local 
government efficiently is required. 
almost exclusively on putting in place some 
form of financing scheme.48 At present, 
there continues to be too much emphasis 
in many countries of the region on the 
decentralization processes simply 
understood "as the provision of some of 
revenue sharing and transfers" to local 
governments, ignoring the fundamental rule 
that "finance should follow function." 
On closer analysis, the assignment of 
functional responsibilities remains in many 
cases too general and vague. For example 
in El Salvador, the municipal code gives 
authority to municipalities to perform a list 
of responsibilities that clearly overlap with 
those also assigned to central 
government; the same is true in Uruguay. 
In other cases, the vagueness lies in the 
48. See Bahl and Martinez-
Vazquez (2006) for a 
discussion of the proper 
sequencing of 
decentralization 
reforms. 
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way that legislation is implemented (or not 
implemented). For example, Law 66 of 
1997 in the Dominican Republic added 
primary and secondary education to the 
responsibilities of local governments; yet 
real power and decision-making remain 
with the regional Education and Culture 
committees, which may be considered a 
deconcentrated tier of the central 
government.49 
Beyond the operational inefficiencies 
associated with the unclear assignments 
of functions, an important consequence is 
the ambiguity in political accountability 
this situation introduces. The governance 
implications for attaining the purported 
benefits of decentralization are quite 
considerable. 
49. Although the trend in 
the region has been 
toward more 
devolution of 
responsibilities to local 
governments, there 
are exceptions. For 
example, Jamaica has 
been recentralizing 
functions previously 
assigned to the local 
governments (Parish 
Councils) through the 
creation of national 
entities under the 
tutelage of the Ministry 
of Local Government, 
which is in charge of 
fire protection 
services, parks and 
markets. 
50. See, for example, the 
discussion in Porto 
(2009). 
Another problem is that the assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities in practically 
all Latin American countries is uniform for 
all local governments, regardless of their 
size and administrative capacity. As 
aforementioned, a good way to address 
these shortcomings is the creation of 
associations of local governments into 
mancomunidades. Alternatively, there 
may be room for asymmetric assignments 
for municipalities of different size and 
administrative capacity. 
Nevertheless, the highly asymmetric 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
can lead to confusion. For example, in 
Ecuador, the Constitution (Article 226) 
establishes the obligation of central 
government to transfer functional compe­
tencies at the discretion (by voluntary 
request) of sub-national governments. 
This means that any sub-national 
government can request a full or partial 
competence in a particular area at their 
discretion, leading to great heterogeneity 
in central-local relations, thereby compro­
mising the overall effectiveness of inter­
governmental coordination. A better 
practice could be to design two or at most 
three different packages of expenditure 
responsibilities that can be devolved to 
local governments depending on their 
administrative capacity. However, an 
important issue with asymmetric 
approaches is the need for using verifiable 
criteria, that is, differential assignments 
must be grounded in something other than 
political connections. 
Another factor contributing to confusion in 
the assignment of expenditure res­
ponsibilities is the common practice of 
unfunded mandates. Frequently, line mi­
nistries may partially decentralize certain 
competencies to local governments with­
out providing the required resources to 
implement them properly. There may also 
be increased reporting requirements on 
local governments without adequate 
coordination among central government 
agencies or the provision of the technical 
and financial means to make that 
reporting possible. 
A workable system of expenditure assign­
ments, no matter how specific, is develo­
ped in the laws and regulations, which 
always requires coordination and effective 
dialog between the different levels of 
governments. Because of the larger num­
ber of municipalities, it is important that 
the voice of these local governments be 
represented by associations of municipali­
ties. On this front there has been consider­
able progress since practically all 
countries in the region have developed 
effective municipal associations.50 How­
ever, central authorities have not always 
recognized these associations as strategic 
partners in improving policy design in 
expenditure assignments and the 
strengthening of other components of the 
fiscal decentralization systems. 
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One final issue in the practice of expen­
diture assignments is the practically uni­
versal lack of effective and transparent 
methodologies to translate the assignment 
of functional responsibilities into expendi­
ture needs. Sometimes, historical costs 
(or levels of expenditures prior to decen­
tralization) are used as a guide. Different 
methodologies are used in other countries 
around the world, such as the use per-client 
spending norms or bottom-up cost 
estimates that could be successfully 
implemented in the region. The advantage 
of having some effective method to 
calculate expenditure needs is that the 
discussions on and ultimate design of 
revenue assignments, whether through 
own revenue or fiscal transfers, becomes 
more informed and rational. 
Insufficient revenue autonomy 
The level of tax revenue autonomy of local 
governments differs quite significantly 
across Latin American countries. Countries 
such as Brazil and Chile have relatively 
high autonomy and countries such as El 
Salvador, Mexico and Peru have signi­
ficantly less. But, in general, as it occurs in 
some other regions of the world (Africa, 
Asia and many European countries), local 
revenue autonomy in Latin America re­
mains below what is desirable. 
The lion's share of financing for local 
governments in the region continues to 
come from different forms of central 
government transfers including revenue 
sharing. Transfers have experienced an 
increase as the most often used form of 
newly devolved financing responsibility for 
local governments. With this in mind, 
some important and correct policies have 
been adopted for various countries in the 
region. For example, many countries in 
Latin America have taken steps to increase 
their share of own taxes in local budgets. 
Most have now assigned the property tax 
to the local level, which is excellent 
because there are many features that 
make it an ideal tax.51 Unfortunately, the 
property tax remains highly underutilized 
for a variety of reasons.52 Several other 
taxes have been assigned to local 
governments, including vehicle tax, 
betterment levies, and different forms of 
business taxes and licenses. These 
positive measures should be imitated by 
countries that still allow little local tax 
autonomy. Another practice to emulate is 
the allowance of a certain degree of 
discretion for municipalities to set the 
rates of their local taxes, between some 
maximum and minimum approved levels. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to make a 
strong case for policy design that allows 
for a greater degree of tax autonomy 
when there is a perception that many local 
governments in the region do not make 
effective use of the tax autonomy law 
granted to them. This is most clear in the 
case of the property tax for which actual 
revenues collected are a small fraction of 
the revenue potential.53 So the realization 
of more revenue autonomy for local 
governments may need to be accompanied 
by a significant improvement in local tax 
effort. However, it is important to note 
that low tax effort (known in the region as 
"pereza fiscal") is a complex problem. First, 
there is often confusion between low tax 
effort ("pereza fiscal") and low tax capacity 
or economic/fiscal poverty of jurisdictions. 
Establishing the presence of "pereza fiscal" 
requires a comparison between actual 
tax collections and potential tax collections 
of every particular jurisdiction; this is a 
complex task in many cases. Second, once 
the presence of "pereza fiscal" can be 
established, it is important to understand 
its multiple roots, from simple political 
economy issues (local officials may simply 
be happy spending funds but never raising 
51. The property tax is 
highly visible and 
because of the low 
geographical mobility 
of its base and 
because property 
values tend to reflect 
well in general the 
quality of local 
services, the property 
tax can approximate 
well the concept of a 
benefit tax, where 
residents pay for the 
services they receive 
(see Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 
2009). All of this is 
likely to increase 
political accountability 
of local officials. The 
property tax may also 
have relatively low 
efficiency losses 
compared to other 
local taxes. In terms of 
administration, there 
can be flexibility in 
taking advantage of a 
mixed local and central 
administration and 
enforcement 
approaches See Bahl, 
Martinez-Vazquez and 
Youngman (2008 and 
2010). 
52. See Sepulveda and 
Martinez- Vazquez 
(2009) for an 
evaluation of the 
performance of 
property taxes in the 
region. 
53. See Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez 
(2009). 
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Box 6.2. A Tale of Two Cities: Bogota's Success Story in Raising Local Tax 
Effort and Lima's Success with a New Approach to Tax Administration 
Bogota provides an example of a local government that has had success in raising local 
tax effort (the city was awarded a prize by the United Nations in 2002 for being the most 
improved local government in the world.) Starting in the late 1980s, The Municipality of 
Bogota began a program of civic education during which it emphasized the importance 
of paying taxes and the accompanying benefit for citizens that derives from a stronger 
local government. It significantly increased property tax collections through a series of 
administrative improvements, including enforced business taxes, privatizing certain 
government run organizations, and successfully issuing own bonds, some times in 
foreign markets receiving a AAA rating,54 Particularly noteworthy is that the Municipality 
of Bogota in 2006 raised 42 percent of its tax revenues from the local business tax 
(Impuesto de Industria y Comercio, ICA). Updating the fiscal cadastre in 2009 has also 
produced significant increases in revenues from the property tax. It is expected that the 
assessed tax base for this levy will increase by more than 50 percent by 2010, bringing 
an additional $51 million in revenues or a 13.3 percent increase over collections before 
the updating of the cadastre. 
In 1996 Lima, along with other provincial Peruvian municipalities, introduced a semi-
autonomous Tax Administration Service (SAT in Spanish), with the goal of increasing 
collections for own local taxes. This followed the model of a national-level SAT. The SAT 
of Lima is autonomous in its financial and human resource management and it is 
financed through a share of the taxes and fees commission it collects. The shared 
collections by Peruvian municipalities range from 3 percent to 10 percent. But note that 
the local authorities are still responsible for regulating and controlling the SATs' work. 
There have been some clear benefits for those Peruvian municipalities that, like Lima, 
adopted a SAT approach. For example, between 1998 and 2007 those municipalities 
that adopted a SAT increased their own revenue by 80.9 percent, or 9 percent of the 
annual average, by comparison over the same period the municipalities that did not 
adopt a SAT saw their revenues increase by 61.2 percent, or 6.8 percent of the annual 
average. The empirical studies show that the trust in tax administration in Lima and 
other municipalities where a SAT was adopted has increased. This could be attributed to 
lower political intervention in administrative processes, higher client focus 
management, improved public relations, and a reduction of corrupt practices. But not all 
have been highly regarded for their new local tax administration. The same empirical 
survey studies identify some issues associated with the SATs: such as a limited link 
between the revenue collection and public services, and the public perception of tax 
administration as "insensible." But some of this is to be expected since the SATs have 
gone against the conventions and took advantage of not always well defined rules, 
especially in the SAT of Lima. One of the key characteristics of the SAT agencies has 
been their innovative drive, including internal processes, the use of modern 
technologies, human resource development, improved financial management, and the 
collaboration across tax administrations. 
54. See Acosta 
and Bird (2005). 
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them), to lack of economic resources 
(building an updated fiscal cadastre is 
expensive), to inadequate methodologies 
for evaluation, to the lack of skilled human 
resources, or even to the negative in­
centives for local tax effort provided by the 
central government's existing fiscal 
transfer system. However, the region 
offers success stories in raising local tax 
effort, as provided by the recent expe­
riences of Bogota and Lima (see Box 6.2). 
A third issue is the need to explore taxes 
with significant revenue potential that 
could possibly be assigned to local 
governments in order to increase their 
revenue self-sufficiency, akin to a flat-rate 
piggy back personal income tax or local 
surtaxes on some excise duties, such as 
those on vehicle fuel. Another possibility is 
a more intense use of betterment levies, 
which can complement annual real pro­
perty taxes. Betterment levies are being 
used quite successfully in Colombia (See 
Box 6.3). A different option is the adoption 
of some form of final retail tax such as in 
the case of Brazil's ISS (Tax on Services, 
as discussed in Box 6.4.) Except that this 
type of tax, although fine within the 
Brazilian tax system where the federal and 
state VAT levies exclude many important 
services from their bases, may be 
problematic because it would overlap with 
other countries' existing VATs.55 
An alternative to the ISS that would not 
present potential conflicts with the 
existing national VATs, is the broader base 
local business tax (Impuesto de Industria 
y Comercio, ICA) in Colombia. This is a 
Box 6.3. Betterment Levies ("Contribucion de Valorizacion") in Colombia 
In general terms, a betterment tax recoups some of the benefits accrued by property 
owners due to adjacent public investment that increases the value of that property 
(Bird & Slack 2006). Since most real estate property is significantly affected by 
public facilities surrounding it, this tax has significant revenue potential. In 
Colombia, this tax receives the name Contribucion de Valorizacion and it has been in 
operation for a long time. The constitution gives municipalities and other public 
entities the right to a share on the added value produced by investments made in 
urban settings (e.g. infrastructure works). The tax is being looked at with interest by 
other countries and in the first Latin American conference of Valorization, held in 
Bogota (Colombia) in 2009.56 The levying of the tax implies a series of steps 
including, the determination of the costs and benefits of the project, the 
geographical area that is expected to benefit, and a method to distribute the costs 
and benefits of the project among the different properties. This distribution can use 
an array of "benefit factors" (use of property, closeness, access, etc.) or simply a 
land area, linear size of lot front, etc. 
Bogota also levies a tax called Participation en Plusvalia57 defined as the contribution 
owed to owners of real estate property as a result of modifications that increase the 
value of property. This is similar to the betterment tax except that it captures only 
changes in urban codes that affect the ways the property can be used or the intensity of 
its use (how much can be constructed) that may increase its value. 
55. For example, in the 
recent past Nicaragua 
eliminated a 
productive local sales 
tax as part of a policy 
conditionality given by 
the International 
Monetary Fund 
precisely because of 
the conflict presented 
by the existing 
national VAT. 
56. I Congreso 
Latinoamericano de 
Valorizacion; 
http://www. lonjadebo 
gota. org. co/Portals/0/ 
Docs/ 
57. Information about this 
tax may be found at: 
http://www. shd. gov. c 
o/portal/page/portal/p 
ortal_internet/impuest 
os/impuestos_ imp/Plu 
s vaiia/INFO%20PL US 
VAUA 
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58. See, among others, 
Deloitte (2010), 
Government of Brazil 
(2009), KPMG (2006), 
Banco Central do 
Brasil (2000) and 
Purohit (1997). 
59. See KPMG (2006). 
Box 6.4. The ISS in Brazil58 
The ISS (Imposto sobre Servicos/Tax on Services) is a municipal level tax levied on 
those services that are left out of Brazil's state value added tax (ICMS). The services 
that may be taxed under ISS are defined by federal law, but the states may decide 
whether to tax or exempt some of those services. The base covers a wide range of 
services including, IT services, rental of premises, medical services, veterinary services, 
personal services (barber shops, etc), professional services (engineering, architecture, 
law, accounting, etc.), education and training, hotels and tourism, parking, leisure 
entertainment (movies, shows), repair services, financial services (by banks, etc.), 
municipal transportation, port, terminal, and airport services. The tax base is the 
revenue generated from the provision of services. The rate that municipalities may 
charge for ISS is locally set but cannot exceed 5 percent (in the past, it could go as high 
as 10 percent). Although the tax rate to be applied is the one charged by the 
municipality in which the business resides, there are exceptions in which the tax rate is 
the one belonging to the municipality where the service is rendered (e.g. construction). 
Producers of services are charged with paying and recordkeeping of the ISS. Buyers of 
services do not directly see the tax they pay as it is included in the price charged to 
them by vendors. 
Although the ISS collects at the municipal level, its importance varies greatly across 
local governments; according to the Receita Federal (national tax administration) 1 
percent of municipalities (out of more than 5,500) account for 73 percent of the tax 
collection. The ISS collected approximately 0.5 percent of the GDP in the mid-to-late 
1990s and more recently, the tax collections are nearer to 0.8 percent of the GDP. As 
the maximum tax rates were lowered sometime in the early 2000s, the observed 
increase in collections as a share of GDP might come either from an expanded tax 
base and/or better efforts in collecting the tax. There is some evidence of the 
expansion of the tax base; when the rates were lowered in 2003. The ISS was also 
extended to services provided by financial institutions, banking services in particular. 
The ISS is not without its problems. One issue is the increased tax on the production of 
products/services for future use, since users of these services cannot identify the ISS 
balance to be paid against the ISS they would receive; remembering that the price for 
the services are ISS inclusive. Another issue has been the management of exports. The 
import of services is subject to this tax, and although it should not apply to exported 
services, it may become subjected to this tax.59 
With regard to the future of the ISS, there have recently been calls in Brazil for the 
simplification of the tax system where-one way or another- the elimination of the ISS 
was contemplated. This viewpoint supports the integration of the federal-based IPI and 
state-based ICMS (both value-added type taxes) and the locally-based ISS within a 
general VAT whose revenues could be shared by all three levels of government. 
However, the increasing importance of ISS in municipal budgets, with regard to the 
potential loss in local autonomy and the difficulties of coordination at different levels of 
government, weigh-in on the other side of the argument. 
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local "direct" tax on all business activities 
(industry, trade and services) that uses as 
its presumptive tax base the monetary 
value of annual transactions. It is also 
levied at different rates depending on the 
sector. The production of food pays a rate 
of 0.41 percent, the sales of alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco products, and fuels 
pay a rate of 1.38 percent, and financial 
transactions pay a rate of 1.1 percent. The 
ICA is one of the most important sources 
of municipal tax revenues in Colombia, on 
average representing approximately 42 
percent of municipalities' annual tax 
revenues, but as much as 72 percent in 
the Municipality of Cali. 
Another form of local business tax with 
revenue potential is Chile's "patente mu­
nicipal." This annual levy, administered 
by the municipalities, is paid for any com­
mercial activity (trade, professional, 
industrial, and sale of alcoholic 
beverages) that requires a permanent 
office location; municipalities select rates 
between 0.25 and 0.5 percent that fall on 
the declared (to the national tax 
administration) own capital of the 
business. The "patente municipal" raises 
approximately the same amount of 
municipal revenues in Chile as the 
property tax ("impuesto territorial.") 
In terms of revenue collection hierarchy in 
Latin America, the two sets of taxes that 
are generally of equal importance are the 
property taxes (impuesto sobre los bienes 
inmuebles, IBI) and the different taxes on 
business activities and services. In a 
distant third place we find those taxes 
falling on the use of motor vehicles. 
Generally, there would appear to be room 
to increase local revenues for taxes on 
motor vehicles. This is also the case for 
local fees and charges in many countries in 
the region; often the levels of fees and 
charges are completely out of date.60 
Unbundling revenue sharing 
Revenue sharing is the most common 
mechanism for arranging fiscal transfers 
to sub-national governments in Latin 
America and in many countries provisions 
for revenue sharing are enshrined in the 
constitution. As mentioned in Section 1, 
fiscal decentralization has often been 
understood simply as the sharing of 
central government revenues without 
relating the additional revenue to any 
particular local and regional expenditure 
assignments. 
One of the most negative aspects of 
revenue sharing in other parts of the 
world is that it can exacerbate the subs­
tantial horizontal disparities across local 
governments when carried out on a 
derivation (i.e. origin basis). Fortunately, 
this has generally been avoided in Latin 
American countries.61 An important 
exception has been the revenue sharing 
in natural resources, which in countries 
such as Peru and Ecuador is funda­
mentally implemented on a derivation 
basis. This has led to significant 
horizontal disparities among municipa­
lities.62 In most Latin American countries 
fiscal transfers from revenue sharing 
are distributed according to a set of 
parameters or formulas that try to 
achieve several objectives, one of which 
is some degree of equalization. One of 
the positive aspects of revenue sharing is 
that it manages to combine the uncon­
ditional use of funds with rather plentiful 
sources of revenue. 
The main problem with general revenue 
sharing is that there is some confusion over 
the exact achievement of distribution 
formulas; pursuing many objectives with 
essentially one instrument tends to be the 
source of that confusion. It isn't always best 
to give local governments the unconditional 
60. For example, 
reportedly In the case 
of El Salvador municipal 
fees and charges date 
from 1954. 
61. Note that this does not 
mean that there are no 
significant regional 
disparities in the region; 
it simply means that the 
more frequent use of 
the derivation would 
have made things 
worse. As discussed 
above, regional fiscal 
dispahbes arise from 
the differences in 
economic bases and the 
more tax autonomy 
provided, the higher the 
potential for enlarged 
fiscal disparities which 
require a higher need 
equalization grants. 
62. In the case of Peru, the 
evolution of 
international prices for 
natural resources had a 
significant impact on the 
transfers system. The 
Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF) 
currently shares 50 
percent of mining and 
hydrocarbon revenues 
with local governments. 
Transfers from central 
government to regional/ 
local governments 
increased exponentially 
after 2000 but 
plummeted in 2009. 
This experience has 
given rise to very 
significant horizontal 
imbalances between 
municipalities because 
shares of mining 
revenues are highly 
concentrated on seven 
departments, 
accounting for close to 
80 percent of the total. 
This has created 
problems with increased 
unspent balances during 
the boom years and it 
has continued to expose 
local governments to 
high volatility in revenue 
streams. 
United Cities and Local Governments 
use of all of these funds.63 The reforms 
being introduced or contemplated in some 
Latin American countries consist 
fundamentally of the unbundling of the 
revenue sharing system into two additional 
separate transfer mechanisms, namely: (i) 
an equalization transfer with unconditional 
use of funds and financed from a pool 
extracted from the shared revenues, which 
would exclusively pursue the goal of 
equalization of horizontal fiscal disparities, 
or (ii) a system of specific or conditional 
grants for current expenditure and 
investment purposes, financed with some of 
the revenue sharing funds. The use of these 
funds would be earmarked in pursuit of a 
variety of sectored objectives. Advances in 
this general direction have been made in 
countries like Brazil and Chile, while 
countries like Ecuador, El Salvador and 
Honduras are still using an unbundled 
revenue sharing scheme as the main 
funding source of local governments. 
collections are often used instead of 
measures of tax capacity, thereby creating 
a negative incentive for tax effort. The 
current methods used to incorporate 
different expenditure needs in the revenue 
sharing formulas are also problematic. For 
example, population, which is commonly 
used as a good approximation for some 
services needs, is not the right factor to be 
considered for other services. For 
example, the number of school age 
children provides a better approximation 
for basic education needs than population 
as a whole. The relative share of infants 
and the elderly in the population provides 
a better approximation for health care 
needs than the whole population per se. In 
some cases, especially in Central American 
countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
the existing formulas favor small 
municipalities, which in turn create pro­
blems of fairness and economic viability 
and regional development. 
63. The point is to quickly 
achieve a more 
appropriate mix of 
unconditional and 
conditional grants, 
without losing sight of 
the fact that, in the long 
term, it is desirable to 
increase unconditional 
local governments 
funding. 
64. Some exceptions include 
Chile's revenue 
equalization grant. 
The need to rationalize the transfer 
system 
The system of transfers plays a pivotal role 
in drawing together the other elements of 
the intergovernmental fiscal system. It 
makes up for the vertical and horizontal 
gaps that own source revenues and 
revenue sharing cannot meet, and when it 
is designed properly it does not undermine 
local tax effort or the incentives for 
creditworthy municipalities to borrow. 
With the exception of a few countries, the 
current system of transfers to local 
governments in Latin America lacks a clear 
orientation. Most countries have yet to 
introduce unconditional equalization grants 
that incorporate some formula-based 
measures for expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity.64 When some equalization 
elements are introduced into the 
revenue sharing formulas, actual revenue 
Even though many countries have some 
form of conditional grants, they lack 
structure and consistency, especially in 
the area of capital grants. When 
conditional grants are used, the 
complex system is often a problem.65 
Compliance-administrative costs by 
local governments which is intricate, in 
many cases penalizes smaller 
jurisdictions with low administrative 
capacity and dilutes the achievement of 
central government goals. A remedy to 
these problems, following best inter­
national practice, has been to 
consolidate many of these specific or 
conditional programs into block grants. 
While specific conditional grants narrow 
the use of funds (e.g. funds to buy 
furniture for primary schools), block 
grants, while still conditional, have a 
much broader scope for the use of funds 
(e.g., the funds must be spent on 
primary education). The advantages to 
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using just a few block grants are the 
simplification and expansion of local 
government choices, thus aligning the 
final allocation of public resources more 
closely to the priorities of individual 
local governments (e.g., repairing 
the school building instead of buying 
new furniture), without unduly 
compromising the general goals of 
central government's policies (e.g., 
promoting the quality and standards of 
primary education in the country). 
Increasing fiscally responsible local 
borrowing 
Historically, the Latin American region 
has suffered some of the worst incidences 
of fiscally irresponsible sub-national 
borrowing in the world. The negative 
experiences of Brazil and Argentina, 
with uncontrolled sub-national borrowing 
and hyperinflation during the 1980s and 
1990s, are still examples of what can go 
wrong in this area of sub-national finance. 
One consequence of those experiences is 
that the borrowing policy towards local 
governments in the region has become 
excessively conservative and restrictive. 
For example, in Chile, local governments 
are —in principle— not allowed to borrow or 
take out loans of any kind, but either way 
outright prohibition is unnecessary or 
effective. In the same country, indirect 
borrowing through leasing contracts or by 
delaying the payment of current ex­
penditure makes that norm difficult to 
enforce. In Uruguay, any domestic or 
foreign debt issued by a local government 
needs to be approved by the national 
congress. Peru also provides an example of 
legislative conservatism in the matter of 
local borrowing: The central government 
has established indebtedness rules to 
maintain fiscal prudence by two laws (the 
Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency 
-LPTF- and the Law on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Transparency -LRTF-). Besides limits 
on debt service ratios and total debt, the 
laws also limited the rate of growth for 
municipal expenditures to a maximum of 3 
percent per year. However, this framework 
has not been fully enforced because of 
insufficient monitoring, and the lack of 
effective sanctions. Many local governments 
in Peru carry large budgetary arrears. At the 
other extreme, and more like an exception, 
Paraguay, has practically no restriction on 
local borrowing. 
Thus a pending challenge for several 
countries in the region is how to set up 
institutions that effectively regulate borrowing 
without becoming overly restrictive of local 
governments. Many countries are still 
struggling to introduce a credible system 
of penalties for lack of compliance. The 
development of information and monitoring 
systems covering all aspects of borrowing,65 
including budgetary arrears with official 
institutions and private providers, is urgently 
needed. But the key ingredient for fiscally 
responsible behavior of sub-national units 
remains at the political will of the central 
government authorities to implement the 
existing regulatory frameworks. 
A second challenge for practically all 
countries is how to make more credit 
available to local governments for 
responsible borrowing.66 In practice, the 
level of borrowing by local governments in 
Latin America is far too low to meet the 
present large needs for public infrastruc­
ture across the sub-continent.67 The ex­
ceptions are large cities, which tend to 
have ample access to domestic credit 
markets and in many cases to 
international markets with accompanying 
international credit ratings. Thus, the 
capital cities of La Paz (Bolivia) and Lima 
(Peru) display a very different picture from 
that of most other municipalities. 
65. Monitoring systems for 
local indebtedness 
have often proved a 
doubtful utility. In 
Ecuador and Peru 
information on debt is 
taken directly from the 
financial statements of 
sub-national 
governments and is 
not crosschecked with 
other sources. In 
Argentina, the Federal 
Council for Fiscal 
Responsibility created 
by the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law of 
2004 and in charge of 
monitoring compliance 
with norms and rules 
of fiscal and financial 
behavior does not 
receive timely 
information from the 
majority municipalities 
as of2009. 
66. Part of the solution can 
be direct on-lending to 
municipalities by 
regional-multinational 
institutions such as the 
[Confederation Andina 
de Fomento] (CAF) or 
[the Banco 
Centroamericano de 
Inversiones], or 
international 
organizations such as 
the Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(IDB) or the World 
Bank. However, a 
large part of the 
solution needs to be 
the mobilization of 
domestic credit 
sources. 
67. Brazil is an exception. 
United Cities and Local Governments 
The absence of real access to borrowing by 
the average municipality in the region is a 
complex issue. It is explained by a multitude 
of causes, ranging from the lack of tax 
autonomy for local governments to the lack of 
national financial market development. One 
potential remedy for the scarcity of local 
credit is the creation of semi-official financial 
intermediaries or municipal banks.68 As 
shown in Box 6.5, several Latin American 
countries have created this type of institution 
to facilitate long-term credit to local 
governments. However, the experience of 
these institutions has been mixed because of 
the difficulty of maintaining them at arms' 
length from central government officials and 
of operating them with strict banking criteria. 
Issues on the Budget Process and 
Transparency 
Streamlining the Budget Process at the 
Local Level 
Budgets and the budget process at the 
local level in Latin America have improved 
68. Central governments 
also guarantee 
on-lending to local 
governments from 
multilateral 
International 
organizations, 
including the World 
Bank, the IDB, and 
CAF. 
69. See Peterson (1996). 
There are other 
relevant initiatives in 
the region that for 
space reasons are not 
developed in this box, 
including the Banco 
del Estado (BEDE) in 
Ecuador and La Caixa 
in Brazil. At the 
regional level the CAF 
and the IDB have 
been active supporters 
of on-lending 
programs for the 
development of local 
public infrastructure. 
Box 6.5. Practice with Municipal Development Banks and Funds in Latin America69 
Experience with municipal development banks in Latin America has been mixed, as has 
been the case in many other countries around the world. Although quite a few countries 
have introduced some sort of specialized financial intermediaries or municipal 
development funds to raise capital financing for local governments, few of those 
institutions have been transformed into financial institutions with market-oriented 
practices and controls channelling private savings to finance public infrastructure. The 
following is a summary of experiences with municipal development banks and funds in 
the Latin America region. 
Brazil 
The Integrated Program of State Improvements (PIMES) was established as a municipal 
development fund administered by BADESUL, the development bank of the Rio Grande do 
Sul, which owns and controls it. The program has two components: institutional and human 
resource development and infrastructure investments. The first component comprises of 
about 10 percent of the total project costs and includes technical assistance, training and 
equipment for municipalities, the State Water Company (CORSAN), and other state sector 
agencies, etc. The second component represents about 90 percent of the total program 
budget and includes the financing of projects in water supply and sanitation, street paving 
and lighting, drainage and erosion control, and so on. The Municipal Action Program (PRAM) 
was established in 1991 by the Parana state bank BANESTADO, which originally served as 
the bank's financial agent. PRAM was eventually converted into a revolving State Urban 
Development Fund (FDU), administered by BANESTADO with technical assistance provided 
by a legally autonomous organization that in practice functions as a department of the State 
of Parana Secretariat of Planning. 
PARANACIDADE was created in 1996 as a non-profit corporate entity to provide 
institutional and technical services to municipalities in Parana; this institution also 
collects and invests financial resources from the state's urban and regional development 
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significantly in recent times. A noteworthy 
innovation has been the introduction of 
participatory budgeting (See Box 6.6). 
Nevertheless, a variety of issues at diffe­
rent stages of the budget process still 
need to be addressed in several countries 
in the region. In terms of budget planning 
and formulation, there are still countries 
where local governments must have their 
budgets, or certain aspects of them, approved 
on an annual basis by higher levels of 
government.70 Ex-ante monitoring and 
approval of local budgets by higher level 
authorities is not needed where there are 
local elected councils and an effective ex-
post audit system, and courts to address 
irregularities. Local budget autonomy is 
often limited in the case of investment 
projects.71 Another issue in the prepa­
ration stage is the lack of a link between 
planning and budgeting. Frequently, it is 
seen that many development plans at the 
local, regional, and national levels lack 
coordination and do not relate to actual 
budgets in terms of the cost of activities 
for the fulfillment of strategic objectives. 
Practice with Municipal Development Banks and Funds in Latin America (cont.) 
programs, managing the State Urban Development Fund (FDU), which creates loans for 
municipalities at maturity ranging from 8 years for urban infrastructure to 10 years for 
social infrastructure. One of the main explanations for PARANACIDADE's success is its 
support of capacity building for municipalities. 
Colombia 
Colombia has been successful in using its Municipal Development Funds to accelerate the 
development of private credit markets for local government. The Territorial Financing 
Institution (FINDETER), which began in 1994 as an infrastructure financing window within 
the National Mortgage Bank, eventually evolved into a development bank for municipalities, 
working through the commercial banking system. In essence, FINDETER operates as a 
second-level financing institution which re-discounts commercial bank loans to 
municipalities. The banks' good credit experience through FINDETER has led them to 
commit their own resources to municipal lending. Intermediate-sized cities and 
departments in Colombia now borrow primarily through commercial bank loans, while small 
cities and towns continue to rely on FINDETER. The largest cities now finance their credit 
requirements primarily through bonds. 
Mexico 
The federal public works bank, BANOBRAS, was founded in 1933 as the Banco Nacional 
Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Publicas, S.A (National Urban Mortgage and Public Works 
Bank), and has long had a loan program for municipal development. Its operations, 
however, became complex and bureaucratic and the allocation of financial resources soon 
responded more to political than financial criteria. The bank's heavily subsidized loan 
program used to focus on social housing, water supply systems and the construction of 
markets and abattoirs. Since 1988, its interest rates have come close to market rates and 
BANOBRAS has switched its focus to improvements of municipal land registers. 
70. These countries 
include: Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay. 
71. In Peru all public 
investment projects 
must be approved by 
the National Public 
Investment System 
(SNIP) which is 
managed by the 
Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF). 
Through the General 
Directorate of Multi-
Sector Programming 
(DGPM), MEF has the 
power to cancel any 
approval made by 
regional and local 
governments if DGPM 
consider that SNIP 
criteria have not been 
properly applied. 
United Cities and Local Governments 
In terms of budget execution, the 
misappropriation of funds by central 
government is still a problem in several 
countries. For example, in Haiti, 90 
percent of local government income 
evidently comes from transfers associated 
to the Funds for the Operation and 
Development for the Territorial Collectives 
(FGDCT), administered by the Department 
of the Interior. However, recent studies 
show that these funds are not being 
distributed as the Department of the 
Interior claims, and that a significant 
share is retained by the Department to 
finance its own projects. The budgets of 
communes (i.e. the local governments in 
Haiti) are the most directly hurt, receiving 
33 percent less than what they are 
budgeted to receive. Honduras provides 
another example, where the law is not 
respected by the central authorities. In 
particular, while the Municipal Code 
establishes that the central government 
should allocate 5 percent of its tax 
72. See 
http://www. internatio 
na /budget, org/ for 
other experiences in 
participatory 
budgeting and other 
innovations for more 
open and transparent 
budgeting practices. 
Box 6.6. Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre (Brazil)72 
Participatory budgeting has been functioning successfully in the municipality of Porto 
Alegre, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) for the last two decades. The 
participatory budget of Porto Alegre, called OPPA, is a process through which ordinary 
citizens and a team of elected local government officials work together to define a list of 
projects to be included within the local government budget. Through this mechanism for 
the shared management of budgetary resources, local residents perform the role of 
identifying and controlling the implementation of projects. Thus, through the OPPA, 
local residents are closely associated with the formulation of public policy at the initial 
stages, including diagnosis and needs assessment, the intermediate phase of 
monitoring and implementation, and the final phase of control and accountability. 
Since its inception the OPPA has contributed to the improvements in the lives of local 
residents. The number of participants in Porto Alegre has increased year by year, from 
approximately 1,000 in 1990 to nearly 15,000 in 2004. The process has also brought 
opportunities to better integrate traditionally marginalized groups of the population in 
the community's development. In 2002, there was a predominance of women among 
the leaders of neighbourhood associations, delegates and counselors. In addition, most 
of the OPPA participants belong to lower income groups. Other groups, such as the black 
population or, manual and unskilled workers have also seen higher participation rates in 
the OPPA process (City, 2003). According to Abers (2000), who studied the profile of 
OPPA's participants, contrary to some expectations, the process has not given rise to the 
influence of an elite field of people with more education or income. In addition, Santos 
(2003) has shown that OPPA resulted in an increase in the provision of basic public 
services. In 1999 the volume of garbage collected and the number of additional lights 
installed nearly doubled from the annual average for the period prior to the existence of 
OPPA (1985-1988). In 1996, the sewer lines in the municipality were expanded to cover 
98 percent of households up from a coverage of about 50 percent in 1989. The World 
Bank (1999) also attributed to OPPA the paving of half of the municipality streets and 
the doubling in the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools. 
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revenue to the municipalities, in fact, only 
3 percent appears to have been allocated 
in the most recent years.73 Other 
countries, like the Dominican Republic, are 
experimenting with similar situations; 10 
percent of their national budget must be 
allocated to local governments (according 
to Law 166-03), but actual transfers have 
never reached this level and recently they 
have decreased from 8 percent to 6 
percent of the national budget. 
Deficiencies related to ex-post audit of lo­
cal budgets still exist.74 For example, in 
Paraguay, many municipalities do not 
comply with the requirement to send their 
annual financial reports to the Comptroller 
General of the Republic. 
Addressing the Scarcity of Data on Local 
Finance 
The lack of adequate data on local finance 
is a widespread problem in the region 
which has major consequences. Only a 
handful of countries currently make muni­
cipal data openly available to the public. 
Countries, such as Brazil, Peru and 
Ecuador provide examples for best 
practice in this area; for further examples 
in the region see Box 6.7. 
Conclusions 
The analysis in the above sections has 
shown that the Latin America region 
contains a rich variety of experiences and 
lessons, good and bad, about de­
centralization and municipal finance. This 
assortment of experiences and challenges, 
sometimes quite unique,75 has made it 
difficult to draw up a cross-country 
analysis. Nevertheless, there are many 
common themes and challenges facing 
municipal governments in Latin America 
and each country has been able to address 
them with varying degrees of success. For 
example, in Chile, the central government 
has made use of municipal governments' 
ability to increase the effectiveness of 
social policies and encourage innovation 
and competition among them. In Colombia, 
Box 6.7. Annual Publication of Executed Budgets in Colombia 
Law 617, enacted in 2000, charges the National Planning Department (DNP) in Colombia 
with the annual publication of budget results (revenues, expenditures and financial 
indicators) for all departments and municipalities, together with an explanation of where 
there have been problems and where there has been progress. Included in these records 
is a detailed recording of the municipalities' fiscal performance and information on all 
income and expenditures during the past fiscal year. This annual publication is of high 
quality. The DNP collects annual data on revenues and expenditures, as well as the debt 
levels of all local governments. Each local government reports and certifies the accuracy 
of its executed budgets to the DNP through an automated system, the Sistema de 
Information para la Captura de la Ejecucion Presupuestal de Departamentos y 
Munitipios (SICEP). The DNP also receives information on debt levels from the 
Controtoria General de la Republics (CGR). These data are regularly used by 
government institutions and nongovernmental organizations to monitor the 
performance of sub-national governments. The comparisons in performance also allow 
some form of benchmarking competition among local governments; which governments 
are doing relatively better and which are doing worse. 
73. See Cardona (2006). 
74. In 61 Salvador and 
other countries in the 
region, municipalities 
are required to 
undergo a full 
independent audit 
once a year to search 
for signs of corruption 
and misuse of public 
funds. This practice 
does not eliminate 
corruption but it goes 
a long way to keep it 
under control. 
75. For example, the 
challenges faced by 
some municipalities in 
Colombia go beyond 
fiscal issues. Here, 
municipalities in the 
war-tom areas must 
face the challenge of 
being on the frontlines 
against armed actors 
such as drug 
traffickers, 
paramilitaries and the 
Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia 
(FARC). 
United Cities and Local Governments 
central legislation can provide admini­
strative flexibility, with local governments 
exercising control over staff hiring and 
salary decisions, and at the same time 
provide effective accountability mechanisms 
to maintain fiscally responsible decisions 
by local officials. In Honduras, a municipal 
association can successfully provide 
technical assistance and training for its 
members. Changes in the attitudes of 
municipal officials toward broader 
community participation in budget deci­
sions have taken place in countries such as 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. 
In this concluding section we offer some 
observations grouped according to the 
set of issues examined. Yet, there are 
challenges remaining which need 
addressing and it will be necessary to 
continue looking for new orientations in 
future research about public local finances 
in the region. 
Observations on Organizational 
Structure 
Countries with problems of fragmentation 
and small municipalities, should introduce 
legislation and practical support for the 
creation of associations of municipalities 
into mancomunidades for the delivery of 
certain public services requiring a certain 
minimum scale. Other solutions to the 
problem of insufficient scale that could be 
pursued include cooperative services 
agreements between larger and smaller 
municipalities, and the contracting of 
services with private enterprises for the 
delivery of services. In addition, careful 
critical study and consideration should be 
given to the creation of new tiers of 
vertical government (for example, 
regional governments) as a solution to 
some of the weaknesses observed at the 
existing local governments. A cheaper 
more efficient solution can be the 
strengthening of technical assistance 
and additional funding of existing governments. 
In any case, existing potential incentives 
to further fragmentation should be 
removed. In particular, those countries 
with transfer formulas that ensure the 
same amount of funds to all municipalities 
independently of their size should 
discontinue this practice. Where they do 
not exist now, new legislation with 
minimum population and fiscal viability 
requirements should be introduced to 
prevent any further undesirable 
fragmentation of local governments. 
Most central governments in the region, 
and provincial or state governments in the 
case of federal systems, should devote 
more time and resources to developing 
administrative capacity, especially in the 
case of small and rural local governments. 
Some of this assistance can be provided 
by working together with and offering 
support to municipal associations in order 
to give quantitative and qualitative 
technical assistance and training to local 
officials in the most cost-effective 
manner or by having regional universities 
and colleges contracted to tutor local 
governments. 
Observations on Intergovernmental 
Fiscal System Design 
Without a clear assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities to local governments it is 
not possible to have an informed judgment 
on whether or not the level of financing of 
these governments is adequate. Most 
systems of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in the region would benefit from 
an explicit clarification of the 
competencies assigned to local govern­
ments. First, this will require the clear 
identification of the exclusive respon­
sibilities of local governments. Second, in 
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the case of concurrent or shared 
responsibilities between the local and 
central (or intermediate level) govern­
ments, it will be necessary to identify 
which attributes of the particular com­
petence (regulation, financing, and 
implementation) are the responsibility of 
the local governments and which belong to 
higher levels of government. There will be 
no clear assignment of responsibilities, 
especially in the case of concurrent 
functions, until it is apparent which level of 
government is exclusively responsible for 
the different sub-functions involved. Of 
course, the implementation of services 
may be done directly by the local 
jurisdiction or this unit can make 
arrangements for its provision, for 
example by a private company or some 
other jurisdiction. 
If there are significant differences in ad­
ministrative capacity among local govern­
ments it may be desirable to temporarily 
introduce two or at most three different 
packages of expenditure responsibilities 
that can be devolved to local governments 
depending on their administrative capaci­
ties and over time, as capacity is acquired, 
graduate municipalities to the more com­
plete levels of responsibility. 
It would also be desirable to adopt 
transparent approaches to translate the 
assignment of local functional responsibi­
lities into expenditure needs in order to 
have a clear idea of the financing require­
ments for local governments. 
Greater local revenue autonomy is a 
challenge not yet adequately addressed by 
most countries in the region. However, 
there is a need to find a better balance 
between the decentralization of expen­
diture responsibilities and the authority to 
collect local taxes from the residents 
directly benefiting from local services. This 
will lead to more fiscally responsible and 
politically accountable forms of decentrali­
zation. Several options are open going 
forward with this agenda. 
• First, countries that have not assigned 
property tax to local governments 
should do so. Property tax has several 
characteristics that make it ideal as a 
local tax. 
• Second, other taxes that should be 
assigned to local governments are 
vehicle taxes, business licenses, and 
betterment levies on real estate for 
financing basic infrastructure improve­
ments. 
• Third, for countries that have not done 
so, some degree of discretion in setting 
tax rates should be granted to all local 
governments so that they can adjust 
their tax bases, within legislated 
maximum and minimum rates. Other 
forms of autonomy beyond rate setting 
(e.g., adjustments to the tax base or 
the freedom to introduce new taxes) 
are not generally desirable. 
• Fourth, coordinated efforts of local and 
central governments should be made to 
increase the revenue yield of property 
tax and other taxes assigned to local 
governments. In the case of property 
taxes, these should include: regularly 
updated and improved property cadas­
tres and property value assessment 
methodologies, increased effectiveness 
in the collection of tax bills, and 
removal of disincentives for increases 
in tax effort by local governments i.e. 
reductions in transfers when more local 
revenues are collected. 
• Fifth, the introduction of new taxes at 
the local level should be considered, 
including wider use of betterment 
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levies and local business taxation, such 
as the ICA (impuesto de industria y 
comercio) in Colombia or Chile's 
patente municipal. 
Going forward, to improve the direction of 
increased local tax autonomy, would be 
the introduction of a local piggy-back 
personal income tax with a flat rate 
collection at the same time national 
income tax is collected. This latter form of 
local tax is common, in northern and 
central Europe, but it is yet to be tried in 
the Latin American region. Finally, there is 
a possibility of considering the 
introduction of environmental or "green" 
taxes enabled by national legislation on 
the regulation of the environment. This 
form of taxation has not taken root in 
many Latin American countries though it 
provides several important advantages. 
The first is the so-called "double dividend" 
since these taxes not only collect needed 
revenues but also contribute a cleaner 
environment. These taxes can also fit well 
in regional and local contexts. Potential 
levies in this area would include taxes on 
the emission of solid waste and water 
contamination. 
In those countries where revenue sharing 
is a major source of local finance, it would 
be desirable to un-bundle part of the 
revenue sharing system into separate 
transfers, including: (i) an equalization 
transfer with unconditional use of funds 
and (ii) a system of block conditional 
grants for current and capital purposes. An 
explicit unconditional equalization grant is 
needed to address the important and 
increasing problem of regional fiscal 
disparities in many countries in the 
region—based on differences in tax 
capacity or economic base, and 
differences in expenditure needs due to 
geography or the population structure. 
Explicit conditional grants are necessary to 
ensure national standards and objectives 
in the provision of important services have 
been decentralized, such as in education 
and health. 
In those countries where local borrowing is 
not allowed, new legislation should 
introduce the possibility of responsible 
local borrowing. In those countries that 
already allow municipal borrowing, it 
would be desirable in many cases to 
review the current status of regulations, 
streamlining them when necessary so that 
they are not overly restrictive. This review 
should also focus on the monitoring 
capabilities of the central government 
(including "floating debt" or budgetary 
arrears with official institutions and 
private suppliers, and guarantees through 
municipal enterprises) and the 
introduction of a credible system of 
penalties for lack of compliance. 
Beyond the regulation and monitoring of 
local borrowing, an even more important 
challenge for most countries in the region 
is to facilitate a significant increase in 
credit availability to local governments for 
responsible borrowing, especially for 
smaller municipalities. The solution may 
sometimes be the creation of official 
financial intermediaries or municipal 
banks. A large amount of information is 
available within Latin America and other 
regions of the world regarding the positive 
features institutions should replicate (e.g., 
operating with strict banking criteria) and 
those features that should be avoided 
(e.g., operating with less than arms' 
length distance from political authorities). 
Policies to encourage the development of 
private markets for local credit are equally, 
or even more, desirable. But it must be 
recognized that local credit from private 
sources is unlikely to develop without 
more revenue autonomy and greater 
transparency of local budgets. 
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Observations on Budget Process and 
Transparency 
Those countries still requiring ex-ante 
approval of municipal budgets by higher-level 
authorities should phase out this practice 
a n d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e l y  o n  l o c a l  
accountability and effectiveness of ex-post 
audits and the rule of law in order to keep 
an eye on the probity of local budget 
execution. The misappropriation of funds 
in a selected number of countries is a 
practice that needs to be stopped and full 
compliance with ex-post audit rules should 
be ensured. The ultimate effectiveness of 
local public expenditures will depend on 
the adoption of modern budget evaluation 
practices, which remains a pending 
assignment for most countries in the 
region. 
The low reliability on municipal finances 
remains an important problem in the Latin 
American region, affecting the quality of 
policy design and of analytical work. Best 
practice in budget transparency and data 
dissemination in countries such as 
Colombia and Peru, for example, should be 
replicated by all countries in the region 
where publicly available data on annual 
budgets and other aspects of the local 
finances are still missing. An effective way 
to encourage and sustain good practices in 
budget reporting and data generation is to 
make good use of the data, by providing 
information to experts and ordinary 
citizens on performance and by publicizing 
the results in order to create benchmark 
competition across jurisdictions. 
There has been continued progress over 
the past decade with the institutions that 
manage finances and with the practice 
itself of municipal finance in the Latin 
American region. Nevertheless, there is a 
long road ahead for further improving the 
overall efficiency, equity, and accountabi­
lity of municipal finances in the region. 
United Cities and Local Governments 
Latin America Regional Policy Recommendations 
Prepared by the technical team of the Federacion Latinoamericana de Ciudades, 
Municipios y Asociaciones (FLACMA), March 2010. 
Signs of recentralization in Latin America 
In various countries a backward trend has been observed with regard to decisions taken 
on the handover of responsibilities to local governments, affecting both local autonomy 
and financing. 
National transfers to local governments must be stable and regular 
Financial transfers to local government are a mechanism to effectively integrate 
municipal participation into the national budget and constitute a right for citizens of 
territories. Universal services such as education and health are nationally designed and 
financed to ensure equality between territories and, when managed by local 
governments, merit regular and stable national transfers. 
Strengthen collection and take into account the fiscal effort of local governments with 
regard to local poverty levels 
It is often argued that local governments are "fiscally lazy" and invest little in tax 
collection. These observations do not consider the low yield of economic activity and 
level of poverty in the majority of Latin American municipalities. As a result, levels of 
collection in poor areas are often confused with the efforts made to achieve them. To 
complement these fiscal efforts, systems of income compensation should be favored, 
such as unconditional transfers from central to local governments that permit a 
redistribution of resources in favor of more vulnerable, lower income territories. 
Increase the participation of local governments in public spending and their autonomy 
in the management of resources 
It is a recurrent theme in Latin America to measure the level of decentralization of diverse 
countries with indicators such as local expenditure as a percentage of general government 
spending or local expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Such fiscal observations must be 
balanced against real levels of local government autonomy in deciding how financial 
resources will be used, be they collected directly by the local government or transferred 
from the central level. In addition, access to information on municipal finance must be 
improved as well as the methodologies for collecting and recording this information. 
Promote association and cooperation between municipalities to strengthen municipal 
capacities 
In Latin America and the Caribbean there are more than 16 million local governments. 
Analyzing, by country, the total number of Latin American municipalities this is not 
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necessarily excessive to respond to the needs of citizens. However, there are significant 
differences in both the sizes and characteristics of these entities, depending on the country 
and type of territory as well as the municipal human and financial resources. The most 
effective manner to balance municipal capacity - without reorganizing the territorial and 
institutional structure in each country - is through municipal associative movements, that is to 
say, to encourage inter-municipal cooperation. "Mancomunidades" allow local governments to 
mutually support each other, manage services jointly, and undertake local development 
programs and projects. 
Increase the sources of own revenues for local government 
In Latin America the main sources of municipal income -apart from fees and tariffs for 
municipal services- are property taxes, business and commercial licenses, vehicle taxes, 
development charges and transfer systems for equalization purposes to strengthen 
incomes for less developed municipalities. Property tax is the most common, and is in 
use across all of Latin America, with some exceptions such as the Dominican Republic, 
and El Salvador. It is necessary to improve and increase the sources of own revenue for 
local governments. 
Prioritize strengthening and improved functioning of local governments 
It is very important for the success of the decentralization process that local governments 
are effectively strengthened, helping them to better exercise their powers and 
responsibilities and provide good levels of services. 
Improve coordination between ministries and national institutions responsible for 
sectoral policy and local government; the transfer of responsibilities must be 
accompanied by corresponding resources 
One of the most common conflicts in public policy is that of aligning the generally sectoral 
visions of national ministries, with the territorial optic of local governments. Municipalities 
are often assigned partial responsibilities, from national ministries, without the necessary 
resources to successfully implement them. 
Recognize and strengthen the role of local government associations 
Local government associations are an important supporting structure for municipal 
management. The national associations allow for the design and discussion of national 
policies and regulations on decentralization and local responsibilities, with central 
government and parliament; the departmental, regional or intermediary municipal 
associations play a similar role with intermediary governments, and also provide technical 
support to member governments. 
